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1 Introduction and Context
...negotiating a competitive tax regime for ship operation will be one of the weatest
challenges yet to come before the distinctive South Africanflag is seen fluttering froln too
many more taffrails.
[John Hare, 1998, University of Cape Town]
South Africa is a major sea trading nation with a relatively open economy of about 45 to
48 per cent of gross domestic product generated from aggregate import-export trade in
non-gold products [Jones, 1999 and Floor Report, 1993: Summary pg. 3]. With more
than 90 per cent of world trade seaborne, a study in 1991 showed South Africa to be
ranked 21st - in terms of trade volumes - out of 100 countries [Stopford, 1997: 250-251].
Since then South Africa's trade volumes have continued to increase from the 114 million
tons of cargo shown in'the 1991 study to more than 173 million tons (including oil and
petroleum products) in 1998 [Jones, 1999]. However, to compare a nation's share of
world seatrade purely in terms of tons handled is misleading. A more accurate measure
of seatrade is in terms of ton-miles. 1 Because of South Africa's geographical location,
substantial transport hauls are required h) link this country to its major international
markets and suppliers. This generates approximately 1 310 billion ton-miles of "real"
seatrade activity [Jones, 1999]. With a global seatrade of approximately 22 100 billion
ton-miles, this means South Mrica accounts for approximately six per cent of world
seatrade, a performance that would place South Africa within the top 12 international
maritime trading nations [Jones, 1999].
Even though South Mrica is clearly a maritime trading nation, it is not, however, a
significant shipowning or ship operating nation. The South African merchant marine is a
small one [Working Group, 1995: 7]; in February 2000, there were 959 vessels,
comprising 552 742 gross tons on the South !\frican register [Staniland, 2000: II]? Only
six of these ships - owned by Safmarine - with a combined net registered tonnage of 87
140 can be considered South Africa's deepsea merchant marine, on the basis of flag or
1
formal registration. 3 Numerous factors have led to this phenomenon, not least of which
was Apartheid and the restrictions placed upon South African vessels through sanctions.
This historical fact has led to more than sixty South African beneficially owned ships
being registered off-shore [van Niekerk, 1997: 6]. This means that South Africa has a
ratio of trade share to tonnage flag share of about 150 to 1 [Jones, 1999]. Even if we
include the beneficially owned fleet, Jones [1999] calculated that there is still a large
imbalance of trade share to fleet share of greater than 20 to 1. Thus there is clearly an
imbalance which if addressed, could create opportunities for South Africa and the South
African shipping industry.
What kind of opportunities and benefits co;.dd emerge from addressing the imbalance of
trade to fleet share? Arguably, the most pressing concern in South Africa today is
unemployment. Statistics South Africa [2000] reported on the October household
surveys 1998, which showed that whilst the official unemployment rate was 25,5 per
cent, the expanded unemployment rate (including mining) was 37,5 per cent. Thus the
creation of jobs is one of the key benefits that could arise from addressing this historical
imbalance in South Africa's seatrade [see Section 5 for additional benefits].
So how can South Africa take advantage of this opportunity, rectify the imbalance and
reap the potential benefits? One way is to create an environment conducive to
shipowning and operating. This entails not only creating the right circumstances for
foreign direct investment, but also putting together a coherent policy environment that
promotes, supports and facilitates the shipping industry in South Africa. Shipping
companies are subject to income and profits taxes in the state in which they are
domiciled, and in this respect they are no different from any other undertaking. However,
the shipping industry is more sensitive to the level of taxation than others owing to the
enormous cost of ship replacement, which is continuing to rise [Branch, 1982: 219], and
the fact that more than 70 per cent of the international shipping industry operates without
paying normal income tax [Working Group, 1995: 10, van Niekerk, 1997: 3 and see
Section 4]. This is one of the main reasons for investors registering ships under so-called
flags of convenience. Countries like Liberia, Panama, Bahamas, Cyprus and St. Vincent
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and the Grenadines, have a declared open registry policy and thereby encourage the
registration of vessels whose beneficial owners reside elsewhere [Branch, 1982: 219]. In
South Africa, legislative changes to be implemented in September by the Ship
Registration Act of 1998, will help to promote a better legal environment, but this is not
enough. International experience [see Section 4] shows that without the right fiscal
environment, shipowners and operators are not persuaded to repatriate or switch tonnage.
This does not mean that South Africa need become a flag of convenience; quite to the
contrary, South Africa should remain a quality flag, but it does mean that the present
shipping fiscal environment should be reconsidered in the context of the global shipping
economy.
Internationally, the highly cyclical and extremely complex nature of the shipping market
has highlighted the importance of the shipping fiscal environment. Consequently, many
countries [see Section 4] have reconsidered their shipping policies, and at the heart of the
reformation lie the fiscal incentives. Of the many forms of fiscal incentive available to
support the shipping industry, the most internationally recognised and accepted form at
present is the tonnage-based corporate tax. A tonnage-based corporate tax (commonly
referred to as tonnage tax) contrasts with the generic corporation tax system under which
a company's tax liability is based on the commercial profits that the company has made
in the year. It ignores actual profit and instead computes a notional profit on the basis of
the number and size of ships operated and taxes this profit, rather than the commercial
profit, at the normal corporation tax rate. The tonnage rate is generally set so that
notional profits, and hence actual corporation tax paid, are minimal. The mechanism
seems to be an ingenious device for obt~ning virtual tax exemption compatible with
international tax treaty obligations. It departs from normal corporation tax principles of
taxing actual profits to introduce a notional basis which bears no relationship to actual
profits earned. It is widely recognised as a sensible and pragmatic way of achieving a
low-tax regime, and is being implemented by some leading maritime nations [Lord
Alexander, 1999: pt. 37 and see Section 4.4 and Section 4.5].
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This paper considers the potential benefits of a tonnage-based corporate tax for South
Africa and the South African shipping industry. This section briefly introduces the reader
to the topic and provides a background and context before expanding on the main aims of
the paper and methodology used. Section 2 briefly reviews the economic theory and
principles underlying the shipping industry. The section also investigates necessary
economic and corporate taxation concepts and perspectives. Section 3 investigates five
investment theories behind the effects of corporate taxation on business investment. The
section concludes that the neoclassical model of investment will be used to analyse the
effects of the South African corporate tax environment on the user cost of capital. In
Section 4, a critical review of the South African tax environment is made before
investigating the alternative tonnage-based corporate tax system. The section then
continues with an international review of the incidence of tonnage tax. In the light of the
preceding sections, Section 5 investigates the potential benefits of a tonnage tax to South
Africa and the South African· shipping industry. Finally, Section 6 sets out the
conclusions and identifies areas for future research.
1.1 Background
The importance of South Africa's sea trade and associated maritime policy has long been
recognised, and has evolved through the centuries. Historical, socio-economic and
political factors unique to South Africa, as well as the international shipping
environment, have helped to mould South Africa's present shipping policy.
The commercial shipping policy of a state is reflected in the legislative, administrative
and economic measures which the state adopts towards shipowning and operation in the
national economy and international markets for sea transport. While these measures may
concern its own merchant fleet or be directed at foreign shipping, the effect will
invariably have both domestic and international repercussions. For that reason, national
shipping policies are not only domestic matters, but also matters of international concern
[Floor, 1993: 5. 1. 1].
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Jones [1987] produced a study entitled "The international shipping industry and South
Africa's seaborne trade." The document analysed the South African shipping industry
and governing maritime policy within the context of the international shipping arena at
that time. A number of major shipping policy recommendations were proposed. Briefly,
the potential regulatory measures which appeared to be impracticable or unnecessary at
the time included: multi-lateral cargo sharing; direct cargo reservation; direct flag
preference; direct subsidisation and the pursuit of discriminatory port tariffs [Jones, 1987:
ix-xii]. The study recognised the benefits of the freest possible trade environment, but
also recognised that "second best" interventions might at times be appropriate in an
imperfect trading world where many trading nations practice unilateral maritime
protectionism. Those "second best" policy avenues identified as more fruitful candidates
at the time included: the pursuit of bilateral agreements with those of our trading partners
who might otherwise practise unilateral cargo reservation; the placing on the statute
books of potentially retaliatory measures aimed at those states that discriminate against
our carriers; greater support for local carriers in respect of government cargoes; the
pursuit of 'package' deals between landside transport operators and sea carriers; attempts
to secure the shipment of a higher proportion of exports on a cif basis; and a change in
the attitude of government towards the domestic shipping industry as a strategic asset
whose reinforcement would be in the national interest [Jones, xii-xvi]. Since then, the
international shipping industry has evolved, and with it, much of the shipping
protectionism has evaporated.
Aside from the potential regulatory measure identified by Jones [1987], the then current
fiscal policy environment facing shipowners was found to be a supportive one, "broadly
comparable with the tax and incentives parameters facing western shipowners" [Jones,
1987: viii]. Consequently, no major policy changes were recommended. The sole
suggested addition was to make tax allowances available where attempts to camouflage
de facto South African vessel ownership (due to sanctions resulting from Apartheid)
imposed higher costs on the shipowner [Jones, 1987: viii].
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Since the paper by Jones [1987], the fiscal environment facing the international shipping
industry has changed dramatically. In particular, the fiscal policy environment facing
South African shipowners is no longer as supportive as it once was [see Section 5.1] and
is most definitely not "broadly comparable with the tax and incentives parameters facing
western shipowners" [Jones, 1987: iii]. Rather, as will be seen in Section 4, there is an
international trend towards a user-friendly, clear, certain and internationally accepted
form of taxation known as the tonnage tax.
Jones[1992] identified the policy concern for the South African shipping industry without
- at that stage - making any specific policV recommendations. Of the many industry
concerns raised by the document, the issues on differential taxation of South African
shipowners versus their foreign counterparts was highlighted. The paper found that:
For all practical purposes, then, foreign carriers pay no tax in South Africa, and since
many 'convenience' flag operators also pay no taxes on income in their 'home' countries,
such foreign owners can price more competitively than a domestic South African ormer.
This situation, in which South African operators are fully taxed while their foreign
counterparts either wholly or partly avoid tax, places local operators in a disadvantaged
commercialposition, and is a serious source ofconcern to the industry [Jones, 1992: 3].
This paper will consider the present tax environment facing South African shipping
companies versus their foreign competitors [see Section 4], and will also compare the
differential taxation of 'Republic' companies versus international branches operating
from South Africa [see Section 5.1].
In 1993, a "committee of inquiry into a national maritime policy for the Republic of
South Africa" was established under the chairmanship of Mr Bernal Floor. This
committee was tasked to produce a definitive analysis of the circumstances and problems
surrounding the shipping industry, and to chart an appropriate future course for national
maritime policy. The Floor report [1993: 5.1.20] noted that:
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... it is recommended that the Government acknowledge that South Africa is a maritime
country which must use its maritime resources in the strategy of restructuring the
economy to the extent that such restructuring has become essential.
The Shipowners' Association of South Africa (SASOA) [in Floor, 1993: 5.1.21] has
stated that unfair foreign competition exists in both the coastal and international trades
and that this be acknowledged by the Government and the concept of equity or level
playing fields be supported.
Floor [1993: 5.1.6] comments that generally very few countries practice non-intervention,
while liberalism in shipping is currently promoted more as a concept to be pursued by
other countries than a policy which any country takes seriously. Apart from outright
cargo reservation and flag discrimination, the contemporary methods of protection
afforded to shipowners are mainly direct or indirect financial assistance or subsidies, and
non-financial measures which may improve their competitiveness or inhibit or restrain
their competitors. Floor [1993: 5.1.6] lists a number of these protection measures
presently practised around the world, including "tax and depreciation allowances, which
currently constitute one of the main forms of protectionism," albeit of a lesser direct
nature than instruments such as cargo reservation or flag discrimination.
One of the key recommendations made by the Committee [in Floor, 1993: 5.1.83] was:
That the existing fiscal incentives to encourage shipowning remain in place and that
additional incentives be considered taking into account the fiscal incentives for
shipowning in other countries which may impinge on the competitiveness of local
shipowners...
,The nature of fiscal incentives for shipowning in other countries has changed
dramatically since the introduction of a tonnage-based corporate tax in the Netherlands.
Until 1995, the number' of ships flying the Dutch flag was declining as a result of more
beneficial dispensations for shipowners in other countries. Not only were the ships
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leaving the Dutch register, but companies increasingly began to move off-shore. The
Netherlands Government then decided to adopt a policy which rendered the business
environment more favourable for shipping investment and operators, as contained in the
Shipping Policy Memorandum (Parliamentary documents II, 1994/95,24 164, no. 2)
which lists a comprehensive package of measures to ensure that the Netherlands remains
an attractive base for shipping activity [van Niekerk, 1997: 5]. The most important
measure introduced concerned taxation of shipping, and aimed to provide within the
corporate tax system, a simplified, fixed assessment of profits on shipping Income,
known as a tonnage tax [see Section 4.2.1 and Appendix C].
Meanwhile, back in South Mrica, trade prospects improved dramatically in the wake of
the first democratic elections in 1994 in which the African National Congress came to
power. With South Mrica's re-entry into the mainstream international··. trading
community through the abolition of sanctions, and the country's enhanced international
status, the potential for growth and expansion of our shipping industry was very real.
In late 1994, the Department of Transport appointed a series of specialist working groups
to investigate the circumstances surrounding the principal transport modes in South
Africa. The intention was to use the reports produces by these groups to provide an
informed context for the formulation of appropriate transport policy. One such wOl-king
group was the Maritime Transport Working Group (MTPWG), which in July of 1995
published its first report. The Group considered its terms of reference to be:
An investigation and review ofpolicy relating to or affecting coastal andforeign-going
maritime transport, to identify and prioritl~!.policy issues and to recommend action for
the implementation thereof, with particular reference to the Reconstruction and
Development Programme and to the modernisation of shipping administration in South
Africa.
Of the numerous policy issues identified, one of the most pressing was the policy context
surrounding "the fiscal allowances and incentives given to SA shipowners by the SA
8
Income Tax Act." It was noted that the objective of maritime policy here should be to
ensure a level playing field for the domestic shipowner/operators vis-a.-vis fcreign
competitors. It was also noted that in all instances, policy should take cognisance of
international trends, and remarked with regard to taxation that "International shipping
operations should be exempt from normal income tax, in line with over 70% of the
World's fleet. This could be coupled with a tonnage tax system" [Working Group, 1995:
10].
Finally, in 1997 there was a consultative process with the existing South African
shipowners, potential shipowners, the South African Revenue Services and the
Department of Finance. In particular, on the 1 September 1997, a meeting was held
between these interested parties which resulted in a paper by van Niekerk [1997] on a
"Proposed new tax regime for the SA shipping industry." The parties involved were
generally supportive of the tonnage tax, and they had hoped to table the final proposals in
Parliament during the second session of 1998. This has not taken place thus far. Indeed,
there were a number of outstanding issues identified which still needed to be addressed.
The issues identified were:
(i) the treatment of deferred taxes.
(ii) the transitional arrangements.
(iii) the success of tonnage taxes world-wide.
(iv) a sensitivity analysis based on real examples.
(v) quantification of the secondary benefits.
[van Niekerk, 1997: 13].
Since then, numerous articles and papers have investigated many of the issues raised, in
particular the proposals for a tonnage tax by Lord Alexander [1999] to the British
government. This dissertation addresses some of these issues, and adds to the body of
knowledge surrounding the effects of a tonnage tax.
Since the Netherlands implemented their tonnage tax in 1996, Norway (1996), Germany
(1999), and The United Kingdom (2000) have all done likewise [see Section 4]. In light
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of these changes, many additional countries have been re-considering their shipping tax
environments. Finland's Government agreed to introduce a tonnage tax [Fairplay,
2000d], while India's surface transport minister is to seek cabinet approval [Fairplay,
2000c and see Section 4.3].
The new Ship Registration Act of 1998 will enter into force in September this year once
its regulations have been promulgated [Interview 10]. The eligibility of shipowners to
register their ships in South Mrica has been changed - widened - without the loss of the
"genuine link" required under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.4 The changes are:'
(a) the introduction of majority ownership in respect of certain types of vessels; (b) the
provision for the parallel registration of certain vessels on bareboat charter to qualified
persons;5 (c) the provision for South Mrican vessels to be bareboat chartered-out under a
foreign flag; and (d) the provision for the registration of small vessels, that is, vessels
under 25 gross tons so as to secure the availability of ship mortgages, as a means of
securing financing, for small vessels [Staniland, 2000: 11-12].
The Ship Registration Act, however, is only the first step in making the South Mrican
register attractive enough to bring its own prodigal owners back onto the flag, and
possibly even lure foreign owners into the environment of a low-valued rand. Whilst
these legislative measures are most certainly a step in the right direction, it is the fiscal
measures, which include the creation of a competitive tax environment, that will have a
greater impact on the success of South Africa's maritime policy initiatives. It is this
context which lead Hare, the chairman of the Maritime Transport Policy Working Group
[in Lloyd's List Mrica Weekly, 1998: 4] to state:
...negotiating a competitive tax regime for ship operation will be one of the greatest
challenges yet to come before the distinctive South Africanflag is seen fluttering from too
many more taffrails.
In light of this dynamic background, it is clear that in the 1980's the fiscal policy
environment facing South African shipowners was considered supportive and broadly
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comparable with the tax and incentives facing western shipowners [Jones, 1987: iii]. At
that point, foreign regulatory shipping interventions were the main source of concern.
Since then, direct regulatory protectionism has all but disappeared, but more supportive
fiscal policy measures have evolved to a point where South Mrican shipowners and
operators now compete internationally on an inequitable fiscal basis. South Mrica's re-
entry into the international mainstream trading community has the potential to create
opportunities for a strengthening and expansion of the country's maritime community and
the related benefits, but these opportunities need to be facilitated, most importantly
through a levelling of this playing field. One way of helping to achieve this could be
through the introduction of a tonnage tax that has been internationally accepted. This
paper investigates the potential benefits of introducing such a tonnage tax system to
South Africa and the South Mrican shipping industry.
1.2 Objectives and Methodology of the Study
This paper investigates the potential benefits to South Africa and the South African
shipping industry of introducing a tonnage-based corporate tax system. It aims to
stimulate discussion and alert those with a vested interest in South Africa and South
Africa's shipping industry to: the present imbalance in South Africa's seatrade; the need
for fiscal reform; the concept of a tonnage tax; and the potential benefits of a tonnage tax,
to South Africa and the South African shipping industry.
In conducting the study, key documents and relevant data on the tonnage tax and South
Mrica were identified and obtained. These were analysed and then summarised. Much
of the information used in this exercise was sourced from a variety of previous
international studies, most of which were only available on the internet. There are
relatively few international studies on the tonnage tax, and it appears that there has only
been one formal investigation into a tonnage tax for the South African shipping industry
[see van Niekerk, 1997]. The methodology adopted by this paper begins by providing [in
Section I] the reader with a background, and placing the reader within the present fiscal
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context of the international shipping industry. Section 1 also identifies the main aims and
objectives of the paper. The paper proceeds in Section 2 to introduce to the reader some
key concepts in economic theory, taxation'md in the principles of shipping. With this
understanding of some of the key concepts and issues, the paper investigates in Section 3
the effects of corporate taxation on business investment. Five prominent investment
theories are investigated and compared with the result that the theory behind the
neoclassical model of investment is chosen as the methodology to analyse the South
African tax environment. Section 4 then reviews South Mrica's past and present
shipping tax environment before turning to review worldwide shipping tax regimes and
the alternative tonnage-based corporate tax system. Section 5 draws together the
literature review, theory and the neoclassical methodology investigated, and applies this
to analyses the potential benefits of a tonnage-based corporate tax to South Africa and the
South Mrican Shipping industry. Section 6 draws together the conclusions and identifies
areas for future research. Interviews were also conducted in which the author was able to
tap into local expertise and sentiment from diverse backgrounds [see Appendix A].
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2 Economic Theory and Principles of Shipping
The demand for vessel space is a derived demand; that is, transport servIces are
demanded not for their own sake, but rather because transport has the ability to add value
to commodities by moving them from aripr~s of lower utility to areas of higher utility
[Stopford, 1997: 226, Working Group, 1995: 5]. The fundamental purpose of transport is
therefore to bridge the gap between producers and consumers, and the more successfully
transport fulfils its role, the smaller that gap will be. Consequently, the main thrust of
transport policy in all transport modes should be to ensure that transport services are able
to function in as efficient and effective manner as possible. The primary goal of maritime
transport policy should thus be to ensure the provision of the appropriate quantity and
quality of vessel space, and the appropriate range of port facilities at minimum cost. A
further and important goal of maritime transport policy is to secure for South African
interests an equitable stake in the seaborne commerce of the region, and fair access to
international cross trades [Working Group, 1995: 5], within an international market
framework that is as free of impediments as possible.
Previous maritime policy studies have identified maritime priorities as being the
promotion of maritime industries and defending the country's maritime interests [see for
example Floor Report, 1993: 4, Section 2.3.1]. The working group took the wider view
that the principal goal of maritime policy should be to promote all economic ar::ivity
dependent upon maritime transport (including the activities of shipowners and operators),
and should defend and promote the country's trading interests.
Economic theory suggests that the transport sector can function most effectively if four
basic economic principles are adhered to. Tilese principles are:
(a) Freedom of transport users' choice across and within transport modes.
(b) Reliance on a free enterprise systems in which market forces operate in as
unconstrained a fashion as possible.
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(c) The removal wherever possible of market imperfections, such that markets
operate on the basis of the correct price signals.
(d) The equal treatment of all transport modes.
These principles underpinned all of the economic issues addressed by the Working Group
[1995], and likewise are applicable in assessing what optimal tax system should be
implemented in South Africa.
2.1 Supply, Demand and Market Cycles in the Shipping Industry
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the shipping business to an outsider is the totally
different character of the companies in different parts of the industry. For example. liner
companies and bulk shipping companies belong to the same industry, but they seem to
have little else in common. This diversity influences the way in which different operators
approach the market [Stopford, 1997: 32]. Nevertheless, shipping companies, as firms,
act and react to changes in demand and supply for shipping, and like most firms are
influenced by the socio.;economic and political environments in which they operate.
The market cycle pervades the shipping industry, and has long been accepted as part of
the business. Peaks and troughs in the cycles are signs that the market is adjusting to
supply and demand by regulating cashflow [Stopford, 1997: 40]. Fayle [1933, in
Stopford, 1997: 41] suggested that "the build-up of a cycle is triggered by the world
business cycle or random events such as wars which create a shortage of ships. The
resulting high freight rates attract new investors into the industry, and encourage a flood
of speculative investment, thus expanding shipping capacity."
The perception of the cycle suggests a sequence of three events, a trade boom, a short
shipping boom during which there is overbuilding, usually followed by a 'prolonged'
slump. Cufley [(1972) in Stopford, 1997: 41] drew attention to three key events common
to shipping cycles. First, a shortage of ships develops, second, high freight rates
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stimulate over-ordering ofthe ships in short supply which finally leads to market collapse
and recession. The response of supply to changes in market conditions is, however,
lagged rather than immediate. Since the gestation period between the decision to invest
in new tonnage and the actual delivery of that new tonnage is between one and three
years, newbuildings frequently enter the market well after conditions have changed. This
makes the shipping cycle more difficult to analyse, and leads Cufley to argue that the
cycle is too irregular to predict:
Any attempt to make long-term forecasts ofvoyage freights (as distinct from interpreting
the general trend in growth of demand) is doomed to failure. It is totally impossible to
predict when the open market will move upwards (or fal!), to estimate the extent of the
swing or the duration ofthe phase.
Finally Hampton [1996] in his analysis of the shipping cycle notes the important part
played by people and the way they respond to price signals received by the market He
argues that market sentiment plays an important part in determining the structure of
cycles and that this can help to explain why the market repeatedly seems to over-react to
price signals.
Thus the shipping cycle can be seen as a mechanism devoted to removing imbalances in
the supply and demand for ships. If there is too little supply, the market rewards
investors with high freight rates until more ships are ordered. When there are too many
ships it squeezes the cashflow until owners give up the struggle and ships are scrapped
[Stopford, 1997: 42].
Over the last twenty years, the industry has had to contend with a near-permanent
oversupply of tonnage inherited from an ill-timed building boom that coincided with the
unprecedented fall in seatrade demand in the aftermath of the 1978/79 oil "crisis."
Recent shipping cycles have consequently oscillated around a base line that has offered
operators poor profits, most notably in the bulk and tanker sectors. These decades of
poor industry performance have undoubtedly accelerated "flagging out" practices by
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shipowners in search of tax havens, and have also increased pressure on the governments
of trading maritime nations to stem this tide with appropriate fiscal policies.
2.2 Introductory Theory on Ship Investment
International economic theory views ship-owning as a matter of international resource
allocation and nations which are capable of producing shipping services at the least cost
will have competitive advantages and so accumulate the industry's capital. Thus,
provided the opportunity cost of providing the least cost shipping service results in a net
benefit for the economy of the countries affording that service, it will be worth their
while to do so [van Niekerk, 1997: 1].
However, net benefit for a country does not necessarily mean an improvement in the
Balance of Payments. The effect of shipping transactions on the Balance of Payments
often does not satisfactorily reflect the benefits or otherwise of having a national fleet,
because the foreign exchange saved through the shipment of imports in domestic carriers
may be ignored. Furthermore, it is always necessary to take account of the movement of
capital. The net benefit of domestic shipowning and operation is really the value added
to the economy, which in accordance with conventional economic accounting, is the sum
of the wages paid for domestic labour plus the profits earned. In other words, the net
national benefit from the supply of shipping services by a domestic business undertaking,
in common, with all other domestic business concerns, is reflected in its profitability and
employment [Van Niekerk, 1997: 1].
With the globalisation of the shipping market, where most production factors can be
drawn from any maritime country, countries which seek growth in their maritime
industries must necessarily ensure that the national cost elements compare favourably
with those in other countries. If not, shipowners have little alternative but to move the
registration of their ships offshore. The present international trend sees shipowners
transferring their ships to more financially favourable registers [Lord Alexander, '1999,
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and see Section 4.3]. Thus, to compensate for comparatively higher costs of production
factors, countries intent on promoting or maintaining their shipowning industries may
have to consider tax incentives [see Section 4.3 and Section 4.4]
2.3 Why Tax Corporations?
Before undertaking a description and analysis of the present South Mrican shipping
taxation policy, and the alternative tonnage-based corporate tax, we should ask whether it
makes sense to have a special tax system for corporations in the first place.6 Under the
South African legal system certain institutions are treated as if they were people. Thus
from a legal point ofview, corporations are people, but from an economic standpoint, this
notion makes little sense as real people - shareholders, workers, landlords, consumers,
etc. - bear taxes. A corporation cannot. -If this is so, why should corporate activity be
subject to a special tax? Is it not sufficient to tax the incomes of the corporation owners
via the personal income tax?
Rosen [1995: 429] lists a number of proposed justifications for a separate corporation tax.
Firstly, contrary to the view just stated, corporations - especially very big ones - really are
distinct entities. Large corporations have thousands of shareholders, and the managers of
such corporations are controlled only very loosely, if at all, by the shareholder/owners.
Most economists would certainly agree that there is separation of ownership and control
in large corporations, and this creates important problems for understanding just how
corporations function [see Koutsoyiannis, 1985, chapter 15 for a discussion on
.managerial theories of the firm]. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the corporation
should be taxed as a separate entity.
A second justification for corporate taxation is that the corporation receives a number of
special privileges from society, the most important of which is limited liability of the
shareholders. The corporation tax can be viewed as a user fee for this benefit. However,
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the tax is so structured that there IS no reason to believe that the revenues paid
approximate the benefits received.
Finally, the corporation tax protects the integrity of the personal income tax. Suppose
that Andrew's share of the earnings of a corporation during a given year is RIO 000.
According to the standard convention :for defining income, this R10 000 is income
whether the money happens to be retained by the corporation or paid out to him. If the
R10 000 is paid out, it is taxed in an amount that depends on his personal income tax rate.
In the absence of a corporation tax, the R10 000 creates no tax liability if it is retained by
the corporation. Hence, unless corporate income is taxed, Andrew can reduce his tax
liability by accumulating income within the corporation.8
It is certainly true that if corporate income goes untaxed, opportunities for personal tax
avoidance are created. Whilst a special tax on corporations is not the only way to
include earnings accumulated in corporations [see Rosen, 1995: 452], it is an accepted
worldwide practice.
2.4 Income Tax, Subsidies and Excess Burden
Taxes impose a cost on the taxpayer. It is tempting to view the tax burden as the amount
of money that individuals or companies hand over to the tax collector. A simple example
[adapted from Rosen, 1985: 275] illustrates, however, that this is just part of the story.
Consider Company X that uses transport services. This company typically consumes 10
units of maritime goods per year, at a price of R80 per unit. The government levies a 25
percent tax on the consumption of the maritime goods, so that Company X now faces a
price ofRIOO.
7
In response to the price hike, Company X reduces their consumption of
the maritime good to zero, and spends the entire R800 per year on other goods and
services. Obviously, because Company X consumes no units of the maritime good, the
maritime tax yields zero revenue. Does this mean that Company X is not affected by the
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tax? The answer is no. Company X is worse off because the tax has induced it to
consume a less desirable bundle of goods than previously. We know that the after tax
bundle is less desirable because, prior to tax, Company X had the option of consumirtg no
maritime goods. Since they chose to buy 10 units per year, this must have been preferred
to spending the money on other items. Thus, despite the fact that the tax raises zero
government revenue, it made Company X worse off.
This example is a bit extreme. Normally, we expect that an increase in price will
diminish the quantity demanded, but not drive it all the way to zero. Nevertheless, the
basic result holds: because a tax distorts economic decisions, it brings about an excess
burden.
Taxes generally impose an excess burden, which can be viewed as a loss of welfare or
cost, above and beyond the tax revenue collected. The excess burden is caused by tax-
induced distortions in behaviour. It may be examined using either indifference curves or
compensated demand curves [see Rosen, 1985: 276-294]. Excess burden calculations
typically assume that there are no other distortions. If other distortions exist, it is possible
that an additional tax will reduce the welfare cost. In effect, such a new tax restores
incentives distorted by the original tax.
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that subsidies also create excess burden
because they encourage people to consume goods valued less than the marginal social
cost of production [Rosen, 1985: 296].
In order to investigate the direct or indirect effects of taxation, it is necessary to classify
the tax as proportional, progressive, or regressive. The definition of proportional is
straightforward. It describes a situation in which the ratio of taxes paid to income is
constant regardless of income level. It is not as easy to define progressive and regressive
and, unfortunately, ambiguities in definition sometimes confuse public debate. A natural
way to define these terms is in terms of the average tax rate, the ratio of taxes paid to
income. Thus, if the average tax rate increases with income, the system is progressive; if
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it falls the tax is regressive [Rosen, 1985: 241-242]. In South Africa, the individual
income tax may be considered a progressive income tax as the average tax rate increases
with income. The South African corporate or company tax rate is fixed at 30 per cent and
may be considered a proportional tax [see Section 4.1 and Section 5.1].
A lump sum tax, on the other hand, is independent of the taxpayer's behaviour. That is, a
certain amount must be paid regardless of what the taxpayer does. Thus, since the
amount of income an individual earns, and hence his tax liability, is at least in part under
his control, the income-based tax is not a lump sum tax [Rosen, 1985: 280].
Ultimately, to achieve an equitable system of lump sum taxes, it would be necessary to
base the tax on some underlying "ability" characteristic which measures individuals'
potential to earn income. In this way high - and low - potential individuals or companies
could be taxed differently. Because the base is "potential," an individual's tax burden
would not depend upon his behaviour. Rosen [1985: 280] asserts that "even if sur,h an
ability measure existed, however, it could not possibly be observed by the tax authority.
Thus, individual lump sum taxes are best viewed as standards of efficiency, but not as
major policy options in a modern economy."
Rosen [1985: 281] comments that "perhap~ then, lump sum taxation and income taxation
are equivalent. In fact, if income were fixed, then an income tax would be a lump sum
tax. However, once we explicitly consider choices with respect to income, it becomes
clear that an income tax is not generally equivalent to a lump sum tax."
The tonnage-based corporate tax [see Section 4.2] may, however, be viewed as a lump
sum tax. This form of taxation bases the profits of the shipping company on the ships
net tonnage as an underlying "ability" characteristic which is an indication of "potential"
and does not depend upon the corporation's behaviour. The corporate tax rate then
applies to the fixed annual profits as calculated by the tonnage tax. The tonnage tax is
also readily observable by the tax authorities as all ships must register their net tonnage at
a recognised port in the country where the ship is flagged. Thus, a tonnage tax is most
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efficient in that it has all the benefits like that of simplicity, transparency, and non-
avoidance, associated with a lump sum tax.
2.5 The Economic Consequences of a Corporate Tax
The economic consequences of the corporation tax are among the most controversial
subjects in public finance. An important reason for the controversy is disagreement with
respect to just what kind of tax it is. There are several views. Below we discuss the
opposing theories ofa tax on corporate capital with that of a tax on economic profits.
2.5.1 A Tax on Corporate Capital
With the structure of South African corporation tax, the firm is not allowed to deduct
from taxable income the opportunity cost of capital supplied by shareholders. Since the
opportunity cost of capital is included in the tax base, it appears reasonable to view the
corporation tax as a tax on capital used in the corporate sector.
Under a general equilibrium model, the predominant view is that the corporation tax is a
partial factor tax.9 In a general equilibrium model, the tax on corporate capital leads to a
migration of capital from the corporate sector until after-tax rates of return are equal
throughout the economy. In the process, the rate of return to capital in the non-corporate
sector is depressed so that ultimately all owners of capital, not just those in the corporate
sector, are affected. The reallocation of capital between the two sectors also affects the
return to labour. The extent to which capital and labour bear the ultimate burden of the
tax depends on the technologies used in production in each of the sectors, as well as the
structure of consumers' demands for corporate and non-corporate goods [Rosen, 1995:
436].
With regard to efficiency, by inducing less capital accumulation in the corporate sector
than otherwise would have been the case, the corporation tax diverts capital from it~ most
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productive uses and creates an excess burden. For instance, Jorgenson and Yuri [1991:
503 in Rosen, 1995: 436] estimated that the increase in excess burden - the marginal
excess burden - when one more dollar is raised via the American corporation tax is 45
cents. The Harberger model [1974c in Rosen, 1995: 436] assumes perfect competition
and profit-maximising behaviour. Without these conditions, a tax on corporate capital
may have quite different incidence and efficiency implications. Moreover, the model is
static - the total amount of capital to be allocated between the corporate and non-
corporate sectors is fixed. Suppose that over time, the tax on corporate capital changes
the total amount of capital available to the economy. If the tax lowers the total amount of
capital, the marginal product of labour, and hence the wage rate, falls. Thus, labour bears
a greater share of the burden than otherwise would have been the case. If the tax
increases the amount of capital, just the opposite results. Hence, if we accept the view of
the corporation tax as a partial factor tax, its efficiency and incidence effects are not at all
clear [Rosen, 1995: 436].
2.5.2 A Tax on Economic Profits
An alternative view examined by Rosen [1995: 436-437] is that the corporation tax is a
tax on economic profits. This view is based on the observation that the tax base is
determined by subtracting costs of production from gross corporate income, leaving only
"profits."
The incidence of a tax on economic profits is straightforward. As long as a firm
maximises economic profits, a tax on them induces no adjustments in firm behaviour;
that is, all decisions regarding prices and production are unchanged. Hence, there is no
way to shift the tax, and it is borne by the owners of the firm at the time the tax is levied.
Moreover, by virtue of the fact that the tax leaves behaviour unchanged, it generates no
misallocation of resources. Hence, the excess burden is zero. However, Rosen [1995:
436] points out that modeling the corporation tax as a simple tax on economic profits is
almost certainly wrong. He notes that the base of a pure profits tax is computed by
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subtracting from gross earnings the value of all inputs including the opportunity C0st of
the inputs supplied by the owners. Since no such deduction for the capital supplied by
shareholders is allowed the base of the tax must include elements other than economic
profits.
Nevertheless, there are circumstances under which the corporation tax is equivalent to an
economic profits tax. Stiglitz [1973 in Rosen, 1995: 437] showed that under certain
conditions, as long as the corporation is allowed to deduct interest payments made to its
creditors, the corporation tax amounts to a tax on economic profits. To understand the
reasoning behind Stiglitz's result, consider a firm that is contemplating the purchase of a
machine costing RI 000. Suppose the before-tax value of the output produced by the
machine is known with certainty to be Grands. . To finance the purchase, the firm
borrows Rl 000 and must pay an interest charge of r rands. In the absence of any taxes,
the firm buys the machine if the net return (total revenue minus depreciation minus
interest) is positive. Algebraically, the firm purchases the machine if:
G-r> 0
Now assume that a corporation tax with the following features is levied: (1) net income is
taxed at rate fJ, and (2) net income is computed by subtracting interest costs from total
revenue. How does such a tax influence the firm's decision about whether to undertake
the project? Clearly, the firm must make its decision on the basis of the aftt;r-tax
profitability of the project. In light of feature 2, the firm's taxable income is G - r.
Given feature 1, the project therefore crea~es a tax liability of 8(G - r), so the after-tax
profit on the project is (1 - fJ)(G - r). The firm does the project only if the after-tax profit
is positive; that is if:
(1 - fJ)(G - r) > 0
Now note that any project that passes the after-tax criterion (2) also satisfies the before-
tax criterion (1). [Just divide equation (2) through by (1 - fJ) to get equation (1)]. Hence,
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imposition of the tax leaves the firm's investment decision unchanged - anything it would
have done before the tax, it will do after. The owners of the firm continue to behave
exactly as they did before the imposition of a corporate tax: they simply lose some of
their profit on the investment to the government. In this sense the tax is equivalent to an
economic profits tax. And like an economic profits tax, its incidence is on the owners of
the firm, and it creates no excess burden.
This conclusion depends critically on the m::derlying assumptions, and these can easily be
called into question. In particular, the argument assumes that firms finance their
additional projects by borrowing. There are several reasons why they might instead raise
money by selling shares or using retained earnings. For example, firms may face
constraints in the capital market and be unable to borrow all they want. Alternatively, if a
firm is uncertain about the project's return, as is often the case in ship investment, it
might be reluctant to finance the project by borrowing [Stokes, 1997]. If thinl;s go
wrong, the greater a firm's debt, the higher the probability of bankruptcy, ceteris paribus
[Rosen, 1995: 438 and see Section 2.1].
Hence, the main contribution of Stiglitz's analysis is not the conclusion that the corporate
tax has no excess burden. Rather, the key insight is that the way in which corporations
finance their investments has a major influence on how the corporation tax affects the
economy [Rosen, 1995: 438 and see Section 6.1].
This section has introduced the reader to some of the key concepts in economic theory,
taxation and in the principles of shipping. With this understanding and background,
Section 3 moves on to investigate the theory behind the effects of corporate taxation on
business investment.
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3 The Effects of Corporate Taxation on Business Investment:
A Theoretical Excursion
This section investigates the theory behind the effects of a change in the corporate tax
environment on the level of capital investment. The investment theory behind the
accelerator, cash flow, neoclassical, Tobin's q, and time series models are investigated.
The neoclassical model is ultimately chosen to calculate the impact of a change in the
South African tax environment on the user cost of capital [see Section 5.1]. A
comparative study by Kopcke [1977, 1982 and 1985 in Berndt, 1991: 270-277] on the
five models is summarised. This study shows that at present, due to our inability to
measure expectations, none of the econometric models investigated are suitable for
analysing the relationship between a change in the user cost of capital and the effect on
business investment. Numerous studies have shown, however, that there is an inverse
relationship between the user cost of capital and business investment; that is, the lower
the user cost of capital, the higher the investment [Feldstein, 1987]. Hence the theory
behind the neoclassical calculation of the user cost of capital is explained. This theory is
used later in Section 5.1 to show the effects of a change in the South African tax
environment on the user cost of capital.
3.1 Corporate Tax Effects on Business Investment
The corporation tax influences a wide range ofcorporate decisions on:
• the total amount ofphysical investment to make;
• the types of physical assets to purchase; and
• the way to finance these investments.
[Lumby, 1994: 13 and Rosen 1995: 438].
In a sense, it is artificial to discuss these decisions separately, because presumably the
firm makes them simultaneously. However, it is possible to discuss these topics
separately as each of these areas could require a paper. The types of physical assets to
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purchase and the way to finance these investments are suggested as areas for future
research [see Section 6.1]. This Section investigates the theory behind how a change in
the corporate tax environment influences the total amount of physical investment to
make.
3.2 Total Physical Investment
A firm's net investment during a given period is the increase in physical assets during
that time. The main policy question is whether features such as accelerated depreciation
and the investment tax credit (ITC) stimulate investment demand. The question is
important. For example, when President Clinton proposed reinstating the investment tax
credit in 1993, he argued that it would increase investment substantially. His opponents
asserted that it would not have much effect [Rosen, 1995: 438]. Who was right? The
answer depends in part on your view of how corporations make their investment
decisions. Many different models have been proposed, and there is no agreement on
which is the best. This section briefly reviews five investment models that have received
substantial attention.
3.2.1 The Accelerator Model
Suppose the ratio of capital to output in production is fixed. For example, production of
every unit of output requires three units of capital. Then for each unit increase in output,
the firm must increase its capital stock by investing three units of capital. Thus, the main
determinant of the amount of investment is changes in the level of output [Rosen, 1995:
439]. This theory, sometimes referred to as the accelerator model, was put forward by
Clark in 1917 as a possible reason to rationalise the volatility of investment expenditure
[Berndt, 1991: 233]. The theory implies that depreciation allowances and ITCs are for
the most part irrelevant when it comes to influencing physical investment. It is only the
quantity of output that influences the amount of investment, because technology dictates
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the ratio in which capital and output must be used. In other words, tax benefits for
capital may make capital cheaper, but in the accelerator model this does not matter,
because the demand for capital does not depend on its price 10 [Rosen, 1985: 435].
3.2.2 The Neoclassical Model
Earlier, it was noted that one highly restrictive assumption embodied in the accelerator
model of investment is that the capital output ratio is fixed, an assumption that implies
that substitution possibilities among capital, labour, and other inputs are constrained to be
zero. Similarly, in the cash flow model (as described in Section 3.2.3), only internal cash
flow affects the optimal capital stock, and again there is no role for input substitution. By
contrast, economic theory textbooks have long emphasised the role of input substitution
as a critical element in the economic theory of cost and production. This inconsistency
has been highlighted by Dale Jorgenson [1963, 247 in Berndt, 1991: 242]: "There is no
greater gap between economic theory and economic practice than that which
characterises the literature on business investment in fixed capital." In the decade that
followed, Jorgenson and his associates worked at closing this gap, and their pioneering
studies resulted in a model that is widely used to this day, namely the neoclassical model
of investment [Berndt, 1991: 242].
The distinguishing feature of the neoclassical model is that it is based on an explicit
model of optimisation behaviour that relates the desired capital stock to interest rates,
output, capital prices, and tax policies.
The major pitfall of the neoclassical model is that while it provides a clear framework for
understanding factors affecting the firm's optimal demand for capital, it does not
rationalise investment or movements towards the optimal capital stock. More
specifically, as early as 1960, Nobel Laureate Trygve Haavelmo explained that "demand
for a finite addition to the stock of capital can lead to any rate of investment, from almost
zero to infinity, depending on the additional hypotheses we introduced regarding the
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speed of reaction of capital users." As a result, although econometric models of
investment based on the neoclassical paradigm have explicit theoretical foundations
concerning the optimal capital stock, their empirical implementation has until very
recently required appending to this demand model an ad hoc specification of the
adjustment process from real investment or capital stock to the optimal capital stock.
Recent developments, however, allow the speed of adjustment to be a choice variable in
the firm's overall optimisation process.
The neoclassical model currently receives the greatest attention from econometricians,
[Berndt, 1991: 247] and since the model provides a clear framework for understanding
factors affecting the firm's optimal capital investment, this study uses the neoclassical
model to achieve a better understand of how South Africa's tax environment affects ship
investment [see Section 3.3 for the theory behind the model calculations, and Section 5.1
for the application of the model to the South African tax environment].
3.2.3 The Cash Flow Model
If you ask people in business what determines the amount of investment they make, they
likely will mention cash flow - the difference between revenues and expenditures for
inputs. The more money that is on hand, the greater the capacity for investment. Thus it
has long been postulated that the availability of funds has a significant impact on
investment behaviour. In tum, it has also been argued that internal cash flow is the pre-
eminent source of investible funds and, in particular, is more important than the
availability of external debt or equity financing.
In contrast, cash flow is irrelevant in the neoclassical investment model. In that model, if
the return on owning a ship exceeds the opportunity cost, the firm will invest in the ship,
whether it has to borrow the money or use internal sources. But if the return on the ship
investment is below the opportunity cost, the firm will not invest in the ship because the
borrowing cost will be higher than the return. Further, even if the firm has internal funds
28
on hand, it will not invest in the ship, because the firm can make more money by lending
the funds to someone else than by investing in a substandard project. By contrast, the
cash flow model posits investment spending as a variable proportion of internal cash
flow. Since the supply of internal funds is obviously affected by the current le~,el of
profits, it has been suggested that the optimal capital stock should be made to depend not
on the level of output, as in the accelerator framework, but instead on variables capturing
the level of profits or expected profits [see Berndt, 1991: 239].
A critical assumption behind the neoclassical story is that the cost to the firm of internal
and external funds is the same. Many economists believe that this is a bad assumption.
To see why, suppose that the managers of the firm have better information about the
prospects for the ship investment than the potential lenders do. In particular, the lenders
may view the project as being more uncertain than management and so charge a very
high interest rate on the loan. Or they might not be willing to lend any money at all.
Thus, the cost of internal funds is lower than the cost of external funds, so the amount of
investment depends on the flow of these internal funds, the cash flow [Rosen, 1995: 442
and see Peters, 1993 for a fuller discussion of ship financing].
There does indeeq seem to be a statistical relationship between cash flow and investment
[see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988 in Rosen 1995: 442]. However, the
interpretation of this finding is not quite clear - do firms invest because their cash flow is
high, or do successful firms have both high cash flow and investment? In any case, if the
cash flow theory is correct, it has major implications for the impact of taxes on
investment behaviour. For example, in the neoclassical model, a lump sum tax on the
corporation would have no effect on investment [as is calculated in Section 5.1]. In
contrast, in a cash flow model, investment would fall. Currently cash flow models are an
active subject of research.
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3.2.4 Tobin's q Model
James Tobin [1969 in Berndt, 1991: 256-263] has generalised the cash flow model of
investment and has provided a rigorous framework for an investment model in which net
investment depends on the ratio of the market value of business capital assets to their
replacement value, a ratio known as "q." The theory underlying Tobin's q model is
relatively straightforward and in fact is closely related to the neoclassical investment
model considered in Section 3.2.2 [Berndt, 1991:256].
On the basis of the expected profitability of an investment project, managers reckon the
price they are wining to pay for it; call this the demand price for an asset. The demand
price for an entire firm is the market value of all its securities, that is, the market value of
all its debt and equity in securities markets. The cost of producing all new capital goods
is the supply price and is typically measured by assessing the replacement cost of a firm's
assets. In equilibrium, the demand and supply prices for plant and equipment must be
equal. If the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement value of its assets
were unity, then there would be no incentives for the firm to invest [Berndt, 1991: 257].
Suppose, however, that a firm was operating in a relatively profitable environment and
that if it added Rl to its capital stock of plant and equipment, its expected profitability
would increase s~fficiently that its market value would increase by more than Rl. In this
case the value of the marginal q ratio would be greater than unity, and the firm should
invest in the plant and equipment in order to maximise the return to its shareholders.
According to Tobin, such investment should continue until the incremental market value
just equalled the incremental cost of the plant and equipment, that is, investment should
continue until marginal q equals unity [Berndt, 1991: 257].
A similar argument could be made for a firm operating In a relatively unprofitable
environment. Suppose that the firm were already overly capital intensive and that if it
added Rl to its capital plant and equipment stock, its expected profitability would
increase negligibly, so that its market value would increase by less than Rl. In this case
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the value of the marginal q ratio would be less than unity, and the firm should not invest
in the plant and equipment; its shareholders could earn a higher return elsewhere. Indeed,
the firm might work better on behalf of its shareholders if it sold off part of its capital
plant and equipment [Berndt, 1991: 257]. The above considerations suggest that in its
naive form the Tobin's q model of investment implies that whenever marginal q is greater
(less) than unity, there are incentives for net investment (disinvestment) in capital plant
and equipment [Berndt, 1991: 258].
An attractive feature of the q investment model is that because the market's expectations
concerning future profitability are summarised completely by the securities market
evaluation of the firm, with q as a regressor the lag distribution excludes delays _due to
expectational lags. Rather, lagged values of q represent only order, delivery, and
gestation delays. Although the theory.-underlying q is seemingly persuasive, in fact,
aggregate investment does not always respond to changes in market value consistent with
the simple q theory [Berndt, 1991: 259]. Additional remarks concerning the empirical
performance in estimation and forecasting of the models is given in Section 3.4.
3.2.5 Time Series and Autoregressive Models of Aggregate Investment.
In contrast to the four competing theories of investment discussed in the previous
sections, the time series and autoregressive approaches do not directly use output, cash
flow, market value, prices, or taxes as determinants of investment expenditures. Rather,
in its simplest form, investment is merely regressed on a series of previous investment
expenditures. Such a model with m lagged investment terms could of course be
interpreted as resulting from a specification in which It = a + u, where u, followed an
autoregressive process of degree m [Berndt, 1991: 263]
Viewed in such a manner, the autoregressive model of investment would seem to be a
classic example of measurement without theory, and indeed practitioners of time series
modelling have encountered many such criticisms. Proponents of the time series
approach have argued, however, that despite the superficial elegance of some of the
economic theory-based competing models of investment, their empirical implementation
requires making a number of arbitrary statistical assumptions [Berndt, 1991: 263].
Critics of the time series approach contend that autoregressive equations are not very
useful in that they do not permit forecasters or policymakers to assess directly the effects
of changes in business conditions or economic policy on investment. Such criticisms
merely highlight the fact that unless such models are specified within a more explicit
structural model, and unless appropriate cross-equation restrictions are imposed, the
interpretation of the parameter estimates is essentially unclear. Considerations such as
these once led Zvi Griliches [1974, p. 3351 in Berndt, 1991: 264] to venture a "law"
stating that "any time series regression containing more than four independent variables
results in garbage."
Defenders of the more structural models of investment, however, are also somewhat
vulnerable to specification issues. For example, in the accelerator and neoclassical
models, output affects investment. But causality can plausibly be argued to run in the
other direction from investment to output. Similarly, interest rates and market value
might be influenced by investment and so might be endogenous rather than exogenous.
However, time series practitioners take the view that the potential for misspecification is
very real in the more structural models and that difficult pitfalls in model building might
best be mitigated by analysing the underlying dynamics embedded in investment outlays
alone [Berndt, 1991: 264. Also see Veenstra, 1999 for an application of the
autoregressive technique to shipping markets].
3.3 Tax Analysis and the Neoclassical Model of Investment
Under the neoclassical model, as described in Section 3.2.2 above we found that to the
extent that tax policy reduces the user cost of capital, it can increase the amount of capital
that firms desire, and hence increase investment. This leaves open two impr;rtant
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questions: (1) how do changes in the tax system change the user cost of capital; and (2)
just how sensitive is investment to changes in the user cost of capital? To examine these
points, we must first calculate the user cost of capital.
3.3.1 The Neoclassical Calculation of the User Cost of Capital
This Section follows Rosen's (1985: 436-438] approach to calculating the neoclassical
user cost of capital. Assume first that there are no taxes, no depreciation, no inflation,
and the firm can borrow and lend at the market rate of interest, ig. (The subscript g
reflects the fact that this is the gross or before-tax rate of interest). Suppose the firm
purchases an asset, such as a ship, for q dollars. Because the asset does not depreciate,
the firm can sell it back for exactly q at the end of a year. Then the only cost to the firm
of owning the asset is the money it could have made if it had lent the q dollars instead of
tying the money up in the asset. Specifically, the firm could have earned ig x q dollars,
which is the user cost of capital in this simple example. Notice that the firm will
purchase the asset only if the value of the product produced during the year is at least as
great as the user cost. Thus, in the neoclassical model, firms desire to invest up to the
point where the marginal return to capital assets just equals the opportunity cost of
owning them. Now assume that the asset experiences economic depreciation at an annual
rate 8. For example, if a machine is worth $100 at the beginning of the year (q = $100)
and economic depreciation is 12 percent per year (0 = 0.12) then it will be worth $88 at
the end of the year. Depreciation thus costs the firm $12, or more generally, ox q dollars.
Adding this to the interest cost above, the user cost of capital, C, is
I C = igq + 5q = (ig + O)q
Using our example with q = $100, 0= 0.1~, and assuming ig = 0.08, the user cost is $20.
The firm will purchase assets until the marginal revenues per asset are $20 - just
sufficient to cover the opportunity cost. Now enters the corporation tax, which we will
assume is 40 percent ( {} = 0.40). What, now, does it cost the firm to earn the same $20 as
before? Note that the firm must generate more before-tax revenue, $33.33, to end up
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with $20. The increase from $20 to $33.33 - a factor of 1.67 - is just sufficient to offset
the tax. More generally, because the tax collector is leaving the corporation only (1-8) of
each dollar earned, then before-tax revenues must increase by a factor of 1/(1 - 8) for
after-tax revenue to stay unchanged. But if the firm needs to increase revenue by a factor
of 1/(1 - 8), it requires an asset whose productivity is higher by a factor of 1/(1 - 8),
which in tum, will have a price that is higher by a factor of 1/(1-8). In terms of our
example, because the initial acquisition cost was $100, the firm now needs to purchase an
asset with a value of $166.67 (= $100 x 1/(1- 0.4)) to receive the same $20 that it
formerly received from a $100 asset. In short, if an asset costing $q was initially required
to produce a given amount of revenue, now an asset costing q/(1 -8) is required.
What is the opportunity cost of acquiring this $166.67 asset? As before, there is an
interest component and a depreciation component. Since interest received by the
corporation is taxed (or, equivalently, interest payments are tax deductible) the
opportunity cost of interest foregone is not the market rate of 8 percent, but rather the
market rate times one minus the firm's marginal tax rate. Algebraically, the effective
interest rate is (1 -8)ig, where ig is the before-tax rate of interest. ll Recalling that the
effective asset cost is now q/(1 - 8), it follows that the interest component of the
opportunity cost is:
[(1 - 8)iJ x [q/1-8J = igq ®
In terms ofour numerical example, this is $8.
Turning now to the depreciation component, we note that economic depreciation is
computed as the depreciation rate of 12 percent times the asset cost of $166.67, or about
$20. Algebraically, the depreciation component is now:
I [oj x [q/1-8J
Thus, the user cost in this example is now $28 (= $8 + $20) which is the result of adding
together the interest and economic depreciation components:
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C = {(J - 8}iJ x {qll - OJ
.-
Interest component






According to [Rosen, 1985: 438], the corporation income tax raises the user cost of
capital by forcing firms to purchase more expensive assets than otherwise needed to
generate the same after-tax revenue. These more expensive assets raise the value of the
sum of foregone interest and economic depreciation.
We are not yet done however, because the tax also affects the user cost of capital via
depreciation allowances and the investment tax credit, l/J is defined as the present value of
the depreciation allowances that flow from an asset whose acquisition cost is $ i . If
depreciation allowances lower the cost of a $1 investment to (1 - l/J) dollars, then they
lower the cost of a q dollar asset to (1 -l/J)q dollars. Similarly, we showed that an
investment tax credit (ITC) at rate k reduces the cost of a $1 acquisition to (1 - k) dollars.
Putting the depreciation allowances and the investment tax credit together, the effective
acquisition cost cif a q dollar asset is lowered from q dollars to (1 - k)q dollars. 12 Hence,
Equation 7 must be adjusted to:
I c ~ [(1 - ~ig + oj x [q/1 - 8j x (J - w- k) @
In summary, the corporate tax system influences the firm's user cost of capital in several
ways. By taxing corporate income, the tax makes devoting resources to capital
investment more expensive, other things being the same. However, depreciation
allowances and ITCs tend to lower the user cost. Any change in the corporation tax
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system will influence some combination of e, 0, and k, and hence change the user cost of
capital.
3.3.2 The Effects of User Cost on Investment
After determining how the tax system affects the user cost of capital, the next step is to
ascertain how changes in the user cost influence investment. If the accelerator model is
correct, even drastic reductions in the user cost have no impact on investment. On the
other hand, if investment is responsive to the user cost of capital, depreciation allowances
and ITCs can be powerful tools for influencing investment. Jorgenson [1963 in Rosen,
1995: 441] estimated a regression equation in which the right-hand side variables include
(among others) the user cost of capitaL and concluded that the amount of investment is
indeed quite sensitive to tax-induced changes in the cost of capital.
Substantial controversy has swirled around Jorgenson's conclusion that accelerated
depreciation and investment tax credits are potent inducements to investment. His
analysis has been criticised on a number of grounds. One of the most important is that it
takes no account of the importance of expectations. Compare scenario 1, in which firms
expect the investment tax credit to be raised considerably next year, and scenario 2, in
which investors expect it to be reduced. According to Jorgenson's model, the amount of
capital that firms desire depends only on the user cost of capital in this period. Therefore,
the value of C is identical under both scenarios. This result is implausible: if firms expect
the investment tax credit to go up next period, it would make sense to defer some
investment until then and vice versa. The fact is that we cannot observe individuals'
expectations, and as of now there is no really satisfactory way for estimating how
expectations affect behaviour. Given that different assumptions concerning expectations
formation can have quite different implications for the effectiveness of tax policy, the
validity of Jorgenson's results is thrown into question. Other criticisms of Jorgenson's
model have also been raised. The key point of the critics is that when some of
Jorgenson's assumptions are modified in reasonable ways, the implications for tax policy
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can differ substantially [see Chirinko, 1993 in Rosen, 1995: 441]. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to choose among models based on different assumptions using standard
statistical criteria. Apparently, the sheer complexity of the investment procegs has
stymied attempts to reach a consensus with respect to how sensitive investment is to tax
incentives.
Finally, we must remember that South Africa is, to a large extent, an open economy
[Jones, 1992: 1]. If the tax structure makes investment in South Africa more attractive to
foreigners, saving from abroad can finance investment in this country. Thus the
possibility of domestic saving flowing out of the country makes it harder to stimulate
domestic investment indirectly by manipulating saving, but the possibility of attracting
foreign capital makes it easier to stimulate investment through direct manipulation of the
user cost of capital [Rosen, 1995: 442].
3.4 Kopcke's Comparison of the Five Investment Models
The theoretical investment literature is voluminous, and so it is not supprising that
researchers have frequently compared the empirical estimation and forecasting properties
of alternative investment models. Rather than survey the literature, however, we now
compare results of three "horse races" reported by Richard Kopcke [1977, 1982, 1935] in
Berndt (1991: 270-277). It would be comforting if this series of comparisons produced a
consistent set of winners or losers, but as we shall see, this is unfortunately not the case,
since the relative rankings of the five models change dramatically from one study to the
next.
Kopcke compares the five models on the basis of three aspects of performance:
estimation, static forecast properties, and dynamic forecast properties. Table 1 shows the
results of the study.13 One point from Table 1 is abundantly clear: no investment model
consistently dominates its competitors. In particular, the relative rankings of the models
change dramatically from one study to the next. Further, although the accelerator, cash
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flow and time series each put in one very good effort, they also each put forth at least one
very bad performance. It is also the case that Tobin's q model is reasonably consistent at
second or third place and outperforms the neocalssical model in each of these ex post
forecasts. However, the usefulness of ex ante forecasting is rather limited, since the
ability to forecast overall stock market movements is still severely circumscribed.
In summary, this series of empirical comparisons of five investment models indicates that
econometricians are still a long way from reaching a consensus on what form of
investment equation is most preferable. "There is much - very much - that still needs to
be learned" [Berndt, 1991: 277].
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Table 1: Rankings of Five Investment Models Based on the % RMSE Dynamic Forecast Criterion for
Kopcke's Series of Three Quarterly U.S. Investment Studies
(% RMSE: percent root mean squared error measure oftit.)
39
3.5 Concluding Theoretical Remarks
There is an old saying, "we are so close, and yet so far." While theoretical and
computational developments in expectations formation and in the understanding of
gestation lags (adjustment costs) have provided us with necessary tools, successful
measurement and forecasting still elude us. As we observed in Section 3.4, we are still
not able to predict investment to a reasonably precise level, nor can we even conclude on
the basis of empirical performance what form of the investment equation is preferable
and stable. Progress has occurred, but it has been slow. It is difficult to reduce the very
complex investment process to a limited number of variables and parameters with any
success [Berndt, 1991: 277].
This study therefore uses the clear theoretical foundations of the neoclassical model of
investment [see Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.3] to investigate the effects ofa change in the
South African shipping tax environment on the user cost of ship capital [see Section 5.1].
Although the neoclassical model of investment provides a clear theoretical foundation for
determining the effects of a tax on the user cost of capital, none of the econometric
models investigated are able to predict the effects of a change in user cost of capital on
investment to a reasonably precise level.
Fortunately, the analysis of investment continues to attract great attention. Researchers
today are attacking investment issues from a variety of vantage points. Berndt [1991:
277] concludes that in respect of understanding and predicting the investment process:
There is still very much to be learned The challenge is great, the opportunities are
enormous, and the pace ofongoing research is furious.
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4 Worldwide Shipping Tax Regimes
1994 ushered in a new era of hope for Sliuth Africa and the South African shipping
industry. Under a new democratic South Africa, world markets continue to open their
doors to South African goods and services. However, unlike the 1980s where the fiscal
policy environment facing shipowners was found to be a supportive one, "broadly
comparable with the tax and incentives parameters facing western shipowners" [Jones,
1987: iii], now the South African shipowner had to compete internationally on an
'unlevelled playing field'. This Section reviews the present South African corporate
shipping tax environment, before turning to investigate an alternative tonnage-based
corporate tax system. Characteristics of both the Dutch and British tonnage tax systems
are looked at, along with some arguments for and against a tonnage tax. An international
review of those countries that have consid~red a tonnage tax is carried out, and some
results of the tonnage tax implementation are reported.
4.1 The South African Corporate Shipping Tax Environment
The impetus to change the fiscal regime might suggest that the overall tax burden en the
shipping industry is oppressive. This is not necessarily true because whereas under
normal accounting rules depreciation rates are calculated on the useful life of a long-life
asset (which in many cases a ship could well be classified as being), and for tax pu~·poses
are assumed to be 6% a year, shipping is permitted for tax purposes a "straight-line"
depreciation rate of 20% per annum [Meyerowitz, 1999: 24.5].14 The ability to write-off
the capital asset within five years is not unique to the South African shipping industry,
and in fact is on a par, and in some cases, below the average accelerated depreciation
concession granted in respect of capital investments for industry in general [see
Meyerowitz, 1999: 12.24].
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Also, although income carried to a reserve fund is in general not deductible, there is a
special provision for this in the case of future repairs to the ship. Meyerowitz [1999:
24.17] states that:
If the taxpayer satisfies the Commissioner that he is likely to incur expenditure, within
five years from the end of the year ofassessment, on repairs to any ship used by him for
the purposes of his trade he may deduct an allowance of such amount as the
Commissioner, having regard to the estimated costs ofrepairs and the date on which they
are likely to be incurred, may make each year. Such allowance must be included in the
taxpayer's income for the following year and in respect of that year the Commissioner
may make a fresh allowance.
The purpose of this provision is to spread, for tax purposes, the expenditure, which may
be heavy, over a number of years and so even out the taxpayer's income from sli~pping
operations [Meyerowitz, 1999: 24.17], and this may be seen as the authorities recognition
of the highly cyclical and volatile nature of the industry.
The importance of the capital allowance regime is heightened by the fact that the capital
charge associated with a new vessel is almost always the major cost element in running a
ship, claimed by one company often to be four or more times the operating costs [Lord
Alexander, 1999: pt. 22]. In cash-flow terms, this allows shipping companies to benefit
by deferring tax through continually investing in new ships, using tax losses arising in the
first few years to offset profits from the general company activities. The allowances can
also be claimed by a financial institution which has bought a ship to lease to a shipping
company, in which case the shipping industry benefits to the extent that the tax
allowances are shared with it in the form ·of lower interest repayments. But for capital
allowances (including those to which the shipping industry would be entitled to like any
other industry, as well as those which apply specially to it), the corporation tax currently
paid by the industry might be substantially larger in South Africa (no figures available
from Safmarine nor the South Mrican Revenue Services) and calculated to be of the
order of £80 million a year in Britain [Lord Alexander, 1999: pt. 22].
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Table 2 summarises the major corporate taxes paid by South African shipping companies.
Table 3 shows a comparison of how South Africa's effective corporate tax rates for
'Republic' companies and branches of foreign companies are calculated in 1994 and
2000.
Table 2: Summary of the Major South African Corporate Taxes 2000
Normal company tax
Secondary tax on companies (STC) (Dividend tax)
Capital gains tax
Withholdings taxes - dividends
Withholding taxes - royalty & know-how payment
Value added tax
Stamp duties - marketable securities tax








Nil - if four 182 da s at sea
Table 3 shows that in South Africa, there is a dual system for the taxation of companies,
one part being levied on taxable income and the other part on distributed profits. In
addition to the 30 per cent tax rate on taxable income, 'Republic' companies also have to
pay a secondary tax on companies (STC) of 12,5 per cent on all profits distributed by
companies in the form of dividends. Table 3, makes the assumption that all profits are
distributed, and therefore calculates the maximum 'effective' corporate tax rate.
Apparently [Interview 1], the reason for this tax is to discourage investors from
withdrawing their money from companies and as we saw in Section 2.3, tax deferred is
tax saved.
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Table 3: A Comparison of South Africa's Effective Corporate Tax Rates for
'Republic' Companies and Branches of Foreign Companies:
1994 and 2000
Taxable income 100,00
Normal tax payable 30,00 40
After-normal-tax income 70,00 65 60
Dividend declared (l00/112,5) 62,22 65 60
STC rate x 12,5 x 12,5 xO xO
STC payable 7,78 7,22 ~ ~
Normal tax 30,00 35,00 35 40
STC ~ ---llJ, ~ ~
'Effective' corporate tax rate 37,78 42,22 ~ 40
[Adapted from Tselentis & Collett, 1997: 21, and Mitchell & Mitchell, 1999: 8].
The combined effect of the corporate tax on profits and STC - if all after tax profits are
distributed - yielded an effective tax rate of 42,22 per cent in 1994, which has been
decreased to 37,78 per cent in 2000. In Section 5.1 we see how these changes impacts
upon the user cost of capital.
The existing South African tax regIme IS clearly based on a longstanding
acknowledgement that the shipping sector, due to its unique characteristics and
international context, is worthy of differential treatment. It has the potential to reduce the
effective rate of tax close to zero. The Inland Revenue estimates that the average
effective tax rate for the industry in Britain is currently 1.5% compared with 15-20%
typically for other British industries [Lord Alexander, 1999: pt. 28]. To date, South
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Africa has not made such comparisons, however, the South African Revenue Services
(SARS) believes the type of information necessary to make such calculations should be
readily available in the near future. The access to special allowances, however,
inevitably introduces tax planning into the industry's financial calculations III a way
which may distort what would otherwise be a more straightforward commercial decision-
making process. This is one reason why the shipping industry has been seeking an
alternative.
4.2 The Alternative Tonnage-Based Corporate Tax Regime
Increasingly, the majority of the international shipping industry has come to favour the
availability of an option for individual companies of a different tax structure, called the
tonnage tax (shorthand for a tonnage-based corporation tax). It suggests that this basis of
tax should be available as an option for the shipping industry, but leaving it open to
individual shipping companies to pay normal corporation tax. Once the option is
exercised it is accepted that the company will normally need to remain in the tonnage tax
regime for a substantial period of, say, 10 years.
This section investigates the motivation and characteristics behind the Dutch tonnage tax,
before turning to analyse the characteristics of the British tonnage tax. This section then
considers some of the criticisms raised against the British tonnage tax regime.
Arguments for and against a tonnage tax are investigated before taking a look at
international shipping tax regimes and the worldwide incidence of tonnage tax.
4.2.1 Motivation and Characteristics of the Dutch Tonnage Tax
Until late 1995, the number of ships flying the Dutch flag was declining as a result of
more beneficial dispensations for shipowners in other countries. Because of the mobility
of the shipping business it soon become a regular occurrence for Dutch shipowning
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companies to move off-shore. The Netherlands Government then undertook to adopt a
policy which rendered the business environment more favourable for shipping investment
and operations, as contained in the Sh4pping Policy Memorandum (Parliamentary
documents H, 1994/95, 24 164, no 2) which lists a comprehensive package of measures
to ensure that the Netherlands remains an attractive base for shipping activities [van
Niekerk, 1997: Appendix]. The first measure concerns the taxation of profits and aims to
improve establishment conditions for shipping companies, while the second involves
doubling the existing tax and national insurance credits for shipping, so enabling wage
deductions for shipowners. The latter provision will lead to a further reduction in ·wage
costs for crewmen whose wages are not tax exempt and/or the payment of national
insurance contributions in the Netherlands.
The Netherlands Government in consultation with the Royal Association of Netherlands'
Shipowners (KVNR) also studied all the tax allowances in the European Union (EU)
Member States and many countries outside the EU before providing, within the income
tax and corporation tax system, a simplified, fixed assessment of profits on shipping
income, to be known as a tonnage tax. The tonnage tax is determined on the basis of a
ship's net tonnage, using a sliding scale of charges. The annual lump sum for each vessel
is then taxed at the normal corporate tax rate [see Appendix C].
The existing allowances for depreciation remains in force for taxpayers who do not
choose to be taxed on the basis of tonnage and so does the possibility of applying for
depreciation allowances on the reducing balance. Furthermore, the opportunity for
accelerated depreciation is introduced by ministerial regulation, whereby, using the
straight-line depreciation method, a ship may be depreciated until the residual value is
reached in five years. That method of accelerated depreciation is only possible insofar as
there is a profit from the use of ships for the tax year, equivalent at least to those
depreciation costs [van Niekerk, 1997: 5].
Regular consultations are to take place between the government departments involved in
shipping and representatives from the industry, in order to evaluate the efficiency and
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effectiveness of the measures. Following those consultations, the measures may be
adjusted as necessary [van Niekerk, 1997: 5].
4.2.2 The British Tonnage Tax
British shipping handles about 4% of the world's shipping business and owns 1.5% of the
worlds fleet [Infomare, 2000b]. Until recently, the UK direct-owned fleet was in long
term decline - down to one-fifth the size it was in the late 1970s - and there was also a
heavy decline in the number of seafarers [Infomare, 2000b]. The British Government
,
was concerned about the decline, and sought to address the issue in a number of ·vays.
The following chronological list of events is compiled from Lord Alexander [1999] &
Inland Revenue [1999].
In late 1997, a Shipping Working Group involving representatives from the industry,
trade unions and Government was established. In its report in March 1998, it was
suggested that one of the key steps that the government could take to revive the shipping
industry would be to introduce a tonnage tax. In July 1998, the Government published a
White Paper on the Future of Transport which included a section on an integrated
shipping policy. In December 1998, the UK Government published "British Shipping -
Charting a New Course" - a paper which set out the Government's policy and objectives
for the shipping industry. In March 1999, The Chancellor of the Exchequer
commissioned from Lord Alexander of Weedon an independent enquiry into the case for
and the design of a tonnage tax regime for shipping. The conclusion was that a tonnage
tax regime should be introduced in the United Kingdom as an essential element of UK
maritime policy in order to create a positive fiscal environment for shipping in line with
other major maritime countries. Finally, the Deputy Prime Minister announced the
intention to introduce a tonnage tax in the UK on 12 August 1999. The legislation for the
regime will be introduced in the year 2000 Finance Bill, to have effect so that companies
may opt in for accounting periods starting on or after I January 2000 [Inland Revenue,
1999].
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At the heart of Britain's new shipping policy lies the opportunity for shipping companies
in the United Kingdom to opt for a new form of taxation based not on their actual pr'afits,
but on the size of their company's fleet. Essentially, an artificial or "deemed" level of
profit is calculated according to an agreed formula [see Appendix B] that relates directly
to the tonnage of individual ships, which is then subjected to the standard rate of
corporation tax. Although the level of tax payments that many companies currently pay
may not be significantly affected in practice, a tonnage-based tax enables the company to
have the advantages [as identified in Inland Revenue, 1999 and Lord Alexander, 1999]
of:
certainty, since the level oftax will be known and minimal, which will reduce the
need to make provision for deferred tax and increase earnings per share;
flexibility, since companies will have more freedom to choose when to buy ships
and how to finance them;
clarity, since the company's tax position will be more readily understood by and
attractive to investors, analysts, and potential business partners; and
compatibility and competitiveness with other countries' regimes for companies
in international partnerships.
The main features proposed fOrthe UK regime [Inland Revenue, 1999] are:
Optionality. Companies will have the choice between continued taxation under
the existing regime and opting for the tonnage tax.
Group election. All the qualifying shipping activities within a group must be
taxed on the same basis.
Qualifying presence and activities. Companies opting for the tonnage tax regime
must undertake the "strategic and commercial management" of their ships from
the UK. Qualifying shipping activities include all types of seagoing shipping
services, subject to specific decisions which have yet to be taken concerning the
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interface between shipping activities and oil and gas exploration and exploitation
in the North Sea. Ancillary activities, such as provision of ship management or
technical services to third parties, may also be covered under defined
circumstances.
Entry and exit. Elections will have to be made within 12 months of the adopticn
of the legislation (which will be in the Finance Act, July 2000). Under
exceptional circumstances, taking account of the particular position of individual
companies, joining at a later stage may be possible. Any election will be for a
minimum of 10 years, renewable annually.
Allowances. The tonnage regime will be subject to balancing charges should
companies sell previously acquired ships, but only for a limited period as the
charges are phased out. The treatment of shipping assets if a company chooses to
leave the tonnage regime after the 10-year commitment is still under discussion.
Tax Rates. The formula will be designed to produce an end tax charge similar to
those applicable in other North European countries which have tonnage regimes.
It will be at a very low level which will make clear that the level of shipping
taxation in the UK is on a par with world norms.
Tonnage Tax Rate. Article 8c [see Dutch tax law in van Niekerk, 1997:
Appendix] states that: " ... profits from ocean shipping shall, at the request of the
taxpayer, be determined on the basis of the tonnage of those ships earning the
profits. Profits earned during a calendar year from ocean shipping shall then be
assessed per ship on the basis of the amounts per day."
Table 4 shows the Dutch tonnage tax profits per day. The British used this figure
as the rate which they would use to ensure a competitive tax environment, alld
converted the rate into Pounds.
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Table 4: Tonnage Tax Rates for Britain and the Netherlands
- up to 1,000 tons HFL 2.00 £ 0.60
- between 1,000 and HFL 1.50 £ 0.45
10,000 tons
- between 10,000 and HFL 1.00 £ 0.30
25,000 tons
- above 25, 000 tons HFL 0.50 £ 0.15
[Dutch rates from van Niekerk, 1997: Appendix, British rates from Inland Revenue,
1999]
Clearances. A non-mandatory system of prior clearance will be available to
companies planning election.
Leasing. The degree to which allowances can be claimed by companies leasing
ships to companies within the tonnage tax regime will be limited through the
application of a cap to the value of the vessel leased - the precise details of this
have yet to be finalised.
Foreign subsidiaries. The direct holding of shares in overseas shipping
companies by tonnage tax companies is expected to count as a qualifying activity
and their dividends included in the tonnage regime.
Training link. Uniquely, companies within the UK tonnage tax regime will have
to accept a minimum training obligation which will require the practical training
or sponsorship of a specified number of new cadets each year. Lloyd's Ship
Manager [1999: 9] reports that companies will undertake recruitment of one cadet
for every 15 officers they employ or contribute £400 a month to an industry
training fund.
Enforcement, Sanctions and Review. Tonnage tax is administered as part of the
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normal system of self-assessment for companies in the UK, as subject to the
normal audit procedures built into that system. The regime contains anti-
avoidance provisions, so that companies abusing the regime may be expelled from
it. The Tonnage Tax Team, in conjunction with the Department of Environment,
Transport and the Regions (DETR) is expected to make a preliminary evaluation
of the success of the regime after it has been operating for two years [Draft
regulatory impact assessment in Inland Revenue, 1999].
4.2.3 British Tonnage Tax Critique
Perhaps the most comprehensive critique of the tonnage tax comes from the Chartered
Institute of Taxation [2000]. It comments on the draft clauses issued in December 1999
[Chartered Institute of Taxation, 2000], and begins with a bold statement: "The tonnage
tax regime appears to be a form of state aid tressed up as tax legislation." They then note
that where shipping companies elect to pay a levy rather than meeting the Minimum
Training Obligation, there is no requirement that the government should actually use the
money for the purposes of training people for the industry. Furthermore, they point out
that "the draft legislation is fifty pages long, but nevertheless refers to regulations and
statements of practice. Undoubtedly, it will add significantly to the complexity of the tax
system as a whole" [Chartered Institute ofTaxation, 2000].
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The Institute concedes that the draft legislation is generally well drafted; however, they
have concerns that the approach, initially intended as an incentive, has come out as a
regime that has a number of issues that will detract from it. The approach is seen as a
radical departure in terms of business taxation, even though similar approaches have been
taken by some other EU Member States such as the Netherlands, and departs from the
trend of the previous British Government towards low tax rates and a broad base
[Chartered Institute of Taxation, 2000]. This latter criticism may itself be questioned, in
fact, it could be argued that the nature of the tonnage tax is exactly that - a low tax rate
levied on a broad base.
Nevertheless they feel that if the regime is to be introduced, then it should work as an
incentive. If it does not serve to attract shipping to the United Kingdom, then there is no
point in having such a radical departure from the usual rules [Chartered Institute of
Taxation, 2000]. The rest of the critiques are detailed comments on the draft clauses.
While not so important for this study, those involved in drawing up tonnage tax
legislation would be well advised to acknowledge them [see Comments on Draft
Legislation in Chartered Institute of Taxation, 2000].
4.3 International Shipping Tax Regimes
At present more than 70 per cent of the international shipping industry operates without
paying normal income tax [Working Group, 1995: 10, van Niekerk, 1997: 3]. Some
maritime countries do not tax the profits from shipowning while others allow taxation to
be avoided. It is therefore no surprise that shipowners have flagged out vessels to these
tax havens to a point where well over 50 per cent of the world fleet is presently flagged
under "flags of convenience." Table 5 shows the current top ten ship registers and the
percentage of the world fleet registered with them.
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Table 5: Top Ten Ship Registers
Panama * 4,816 158,021
Liberia * 1,662 104,178 13.04
Bahamas * 1,077 40,914 5.12
--
Malta * 1,435 40,410 5.06
Cyprus * 1,465 37,693 4.72
Singapore # 920 33,170 4.15
China 1,461 23,470 2.94
Japan 1,461 23,022 2.88
St. Vincent & Grenadines * 886 10,999 1.38
Russia 1,310 8,509 1.07
Others 14,775 318,266 39.85
Total 31,268 798,651 100
[Lloyd's Shipping Index, February 19, 200O].
* = Open Registers or flags of convenience
# = National flag with some fo.c. dimension
Table 5 clearly shows that tax havens such as Panama, Liberia, Malta, the Bahamas and
Cyprus have a large share of the world trading fleet registered with them. These top five
flags of convenience registers have registered with them 47,73 per cent of the world fleet.
Van Niekerk [1997, 3] notes that most countries also exempt shipowners and operators
from indirect taxes.
Table 6, gives a summary of the fiscal regimes for various countries as at 1997 as laid out
in van Niekerk [1997: 4]. In Greece and Hong Kong, income from shipping investments
are exempted from tax, although in Hong Kong the exemption is for any investment, not
only shipping.
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Since 1997 there have been many changes in the international shipping tax environment,
and the tonnage tax has been making its presence felt with a number of countries
seriously considering and many adopting the tonnage tax regime. A literature review has
revealed some of the other countries which presently have a tonnage tax system, their
results under the tonnage tax system, and further countries reported to be considering a
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Notes: Types of Tax Systems are Imputation (Imp.), Split Rate (S.R) or Classical (C).
Methods ofDepreciation are Straight Line (S.L.) or Reducing Balance (RE.)
The investment subsidy in Italy has been removed.
[van Niekerk, 1997: 4]
55
Germany
German policy makers have been pre-occupied with overarching political and economic
issues related to re-unification; and because of this, the shipping industry received scant
attention. It took more than two years of pleading before the government acted to stem
the flow of tonnage away from the flag [The Baltic, 1999: 45]. Historically,
containership investors have used the shipping sector to offset tax, rather than boosting
prospects for shipping. The introduction of the tonnage tax at the beginning of 1999 has
been hailed as a life-line thrown to a sinking industry. Bernd Kroger of the German
Shipowners' Association commented that, "the new laws on company taxation have set
the proper course for growth and employment in the shipping industry if the companies
have their central place of business in Germany. Numerous shipping companies have
started to adjust their corporate structures to the new requirements and will probably opt
for the system" [The Baltic, 1999: 45].
The main tax proposal was the introduction of a ship tonnage tax under which ships will
pay a set tax based on size regardless of profitability. Shipping companies would receive
40 per cent of income tax paid by crewmen employed in international shipping for at least
183 days a year. Crews will be open to foreign nationals, including officers' positions,
for which there would be pension and social security payment exemptions. The master
however, should be a German national [Informare, 2000a]. It was estimated in Fairplay
[1998d : 9] that the tonnage tax would be between Dm0.45 and Dm1.80 per tonne
depending on ship size, producing an estimated Dm120 million annual tax cut for
shipowners. Transport Minister Matthias Wissmann said the package would stop the
flagging out trend in Germany, encourage lines to employ German crews and also
encourage training of young people [Fairplay, 1998d: 9].
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Ireland
Although it is not a shipowning or ship operating nation, Ireland is considering setting up
a tonnage tax regime as on option to make the Irish ship register more competitive. But
tonnage tax is just one option being considered, and no decision has yet been taken on
whether ships will have to use the Irish flag to benefit from it [Fairplay, 199ge: 17].
Denmark
Denmark's government was to study the way other countries have tackled taxation of
shipping companies before it embarked on its own reform [Fairplay, 1999a: 7].
According to economic affairs minister Pia Gjellerud, "it's clear that we must study how
various countries have done this. However, the situation has been different in Denmark
because we have not lost much of our merchant fleet, unlike the Netherlands and
Norway" [Fairplay, 1999a: 7]. One might argue that the reason for this may be that
shipping companies in Denmark already pay a fixed amount in tax per tonne, and the
figure is not linked to the profitability of the company in question. Thus it could be
argued that Denmark is already operating on a de facto tonnage tax system [Fairplay,
1999a: 7].
Finland
In June 1998, it was reported [Fairplay, 1998e: 9] that Finnish shipping leaders were
increasing pressure on the government for tax reforms in the lead up to the 1999 draft
budget. They were demanding that the Finnish government follow the example of the
Netherlands and Norway and adopt a tonnage tax. Finnlines managing director Andy
Lagerroos asserted that "it is essential for the competitiveness and future of Finnish
shipping that the European trend is followed in Finland" [Fairplay, 1998e: 9].
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In August that year the finance ministry squashed shipowner's hopes of changes to the
countries tax laws. The finance ministry apparently thought that the move would reduce
the governments tax revenue and that it would mean offering special treatment to one
sector of the economy. The transport ministry believes that a tonnage tax would enable
Finnish shipping companies to compete [Fairplay, 1998f: 15]. The transport ministry
therefore had to study what other options were left to ease the position of the country's
shipowners, many of which had said they would consider leaving the country if the tax
reform was not introduced.
Finally, in June 2000, Finland's government agreed to introduce the tonnage tax instead
of corporate taxing of shipping companies, and to refund social security contributions
paid by cargo shipping companies in a move to stop the haemorrhage of ships from the
national flag. Under heavy pressure from the country's shipping community, owners and
unions alike, the influential Economic Affairs Committee agreed that a draft bill would
be presented to parliament this autumn [Fairplay, 2000d]. Leading companies such as
Finnlines, Neste Shipping and Viking Line have estimated that the Swedish flag is about
15 per cent, and the German flag about 30 per cent, cheaper than Finland under the
current terms. The government's proposal is based on the Norwegian model, whereby
earnings from shipping kept in the company for future investment can be made subject to
a tonnage tax, based on the size of the vessel rather than its earnings [Fairplay, 2000d].
China
China Communications News [in Fairplay, 1998c:14] revealed that more than one third
of Chinese ships are flying foreign flags. The paper also showed that 36 per cent of the
country's tonnage, aggregating more than 10m dwt, is flagged out. The percentage is
growing as owners try to counter the impact of heavy taxation. Ships brought into the
Chinese fleet from overseas incur a 27.5 per cent charge for customs tariffs and VAT.
The result, the report continued, is that some owners have built up debts amounting to 60-
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70 per cent of assets. Owners also claimed that benefits given to overseas operators have
pushed the cost of operating under the Chinese flag beyond their ability to compete
[Fairplay, 1998c: 14].
India
The Indian finance minister announced in March 2000 that Indian shipping companies'
profits were to be totally exempt from income tax if they are accumulated in a reserve to
be used for ship acquisitions over five years [Fairplay, 2000a]. Until now, shipping
companies were entitled to 50 per cent tax exemption. Shipping industry sources
welcomed the announcement but expressed dissatisfaction that the Minister had not
conceded other demands such as higher depreciation for ships (from the present rate of20
per cent to 40 per cent), income tax exemption for seafarers employed on Indian ships,
and shipping companies' exemption from minimum alternate tax [Fairplay, 2000a].
In June 2000, the introduction of a tonnage tax in India to replace corporate and other
taxes for the domestic shipping industry moved closer to reality as the surface transport
minister was to seek 'in-principal' cabinet approval of the proposal. According to the
scheme, shipping companies would pay tax at a flat rate on the basis of their tonnage and
not on the profits earned by their vessels. The proposal builds on the hope that shipping
companies will increase their tonnage by acquiring more vessels when they are in sound
financial health [Fairplay, 2000c].
Section 4.5 now turns to consider those countries that have proceeded further down the
road towards full implementation of a tonnage tax regime for their national shipping
industry.
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4.4 Tonnage Tax Results from The Netherlands, Norway and Britain
Since the Netherlands and Norway implemented the tonnage tax in 1996, there have been
marked improvements in the respective economies. These improvements are not only
shown through increased ship registrations, but also in terms of shipbuilding and
employment. This Section reviews the available literature from the Netherlands,
Norway, and most recently Britain, on the results attributed to the implementation of a
tonnage tax, as the key reform in the countries' shipping policy.
4.4.1 The Netherlands
The Dutch and Norwegian regimes are. most frequently quoted as cases where a tonnage
tax has been introduced successfully. The Dutch arrangement, introduced in 1996,
focused on ownership of vessels through an optional tonnage-tax alongside flag-related
wage subsidies and increased flexibility in manning rules, according to the United
Kingdom's Department of Environmental, Transport and the Regions (DETR)
[Informare, 2000b and see Section 4.2.1].
Table 7 compares vanous indicators of economic actIvIty and employment in the
Netherlands shipping industry in 1995, before the implementation of the tonnage tax, and
from the end of 1998. The tonnage tax has brought significant increases in ships on the
Dutch register over the three years with an increase of 142 ships totalling 1.1 million
gross tons. Ovel~ the same period, employment in the shipping industry increased by
5219, and domestic investment in shipbuilding (that is Dutch orders at Dutch shipyards)
increased by 133 vessels with a deadweight tonnage of 0.49 million.
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[Chamber of Shipping in Lord Alexander, 1999: Appendix].
The success of the Dutch tonnage tax in bringing ships back to the register has been
applauded by senior policy makers in the United Kingdom such as deputy prime minister
John Prescott [Informare, 2000b] and by the DETR [Informare, 2000c] who comment
that the tonnage tax has:
lead to a 25 percent increase in the Dutch merchant fleet, full employment for Dutch
seafarers. renewed shipbuilding activity and the relocation of about 40 shipowning or
management companies.
4.4.2 Norway
The Norwegian shipping industry operates under special tax rules which are designed to
support this highly competitive, global industry. If certain conditions are met, the owners
pay no corporate tax. They only pay tax on their net financial income and dividends,
together with a special tax on freight tonnage. The tonnage tax was introduced to
Norway in 1996. Information at mid-year 1996 and end-year 1998 is shown in Table 8,
which shows that the tonnage tax has helped to bring significant increases in ships under
the Norwegian-controlled fleet, with an increase of 229 ships totalling 5.5 million
deadweight tons. Over the same period, employment in the shipping industry increased
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by 2 200, and domestic investment in shipbuilding, that is Norwegian orders at
Norwegian shipyards, increased by 17 with a deadweight tonnage of 0.02 million.
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[Chamber of Shipping in Lord Alexander, 1999: Appendix].
The total tax levied on Norwegian shipowners in 1998 was NOK 173.5 million compared
with NOK 131.5 million the previous year. Despite this the number of shipowners who
fulfil the criteria for zero corporate tax nearly trebled, from 213 in 1996 to 670 in 1997.
Total taxable income in 1997 was NOK 480.7 million, an increase ofNOK 366.9 million
over the previous year, reports Aftenposten [The Norway Post in Informare, 2000d].
Thus these tax figures would seem to indicate that although there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of shipowners who have elected into the tonnage tax, government
revenues through the tax levied on shipowners has actually increased.
4.4.3 United Kingdom
By the late 1990s, the United Kingdom's flag fleet had declined to only 20 percent of its
size in the late 1970s. The industry has campaigned for incentives to halt its decline since
the early 1980s, saying it was too expensive to operate with British seafarers and under
the UK tax laws [Informare, 2000b].
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The DETR points out that after the withdrawal of the very generous accelerated
depreciation rate of 100% first-year capital allowances against corporation tax in 1984
the tonnage of UK direct-owned ships fell by over 20% in two years. Tonnage has
further dropped by 25% over the past three years following the introduction of tonnage
tax regimes elsewhere in Europe. These examples appear to demonstrate neatly the
importance of fiscal competition [Lord Alexander, 1999: pt. 31].
The UK shipping industry, which is. regarded as a critical catalyst for generating
employment and skills, was in long-term decline at the rate of about 4% a year. Tonnage
fell from a peak of 50 million dwt (deadweight tonnes) in 1975 to only 9.7 million dwt in
1998. The UK registered fleet had declined even more. Only 20% of the UK-owned
trading fleet is registered in the UK, while until the late 1970s it was almost unknown for
UK-owned ships to be registered elsewhere. The Chamber of Shipping had forecast
"further decline in ship owning" under the pre-tonnage tax environment [Lord Alexander,
1999: pt. 10].
The leading British shipping company - P&O - represents 40% of the UK industry on a
gross earnings basis. They have declared their commitment to supporting the
Government's policy by stating at the time of the 1999 Budget that, if a satisfactory
tonnage tax were to be introduced, they would bring an additional 49 of their ships to the
UK register, increasing at once the tonnage on the register by 75%. They would also
over the next three years raise the number of British cadets in training from 170 to 310
and "would expect to go beyond this over time". Lord Sterling, Chairman of P&O,
confirmed to Lord Alexander [1999: pt. 34] that his intention to take these steps would be
regarded as a firm commitment if Britain were to announce promptly in favour of a
decision to introduce a satisfactory tonnage tax regime in the next Finance Bill with
appropriate backdating. This repatriation to the British flag by P&O is well under way at
the time ofwriting.
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In addition to the increased ship registrations by domestic shipowners, many foreign
shipowners have switched to the United Kingdom's registry. For example, Prescott [in
Fairplay, 1998g: 15] announced news that four of Maersk's feeder containerships,
totalling 85,000 dwt, were to be flagged in the United Knigdom. Maersk's decision to
reflag is directly linked to the company's approval of the government's White Paper. The
Belgian-operated Cobelfret has also reflagged from the Luxembourg registry to the
United Kingdom's registry.
The international trend in favour of a tonnage tax system, and the benefits arising from
the enhanced competitive shipping fiscal environment through a tonnage-based corporate
tax, are clearly visible from the international review of Section 4.4 and Section 4.5. In
the light of the preceding discussions and observed international tends, Section 5
investigates the potential benefits of a tonnage-based corporate tax to South Africa and
the South African shipping industry.
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5 The Potential Benefits of a Tonnage-Based Corporate Tax to
South Africa and the South African Shipping Industry
South Africa is leading Mrica into what has been called the Mrican Century. In 1993,
foreign direct investment in South Africa amounted to R941 million as compareJ with
just under R6,5 billion in 1998 [President Mbeki, 2000]. This is a clear indication that
investors arebegliming to view South Africa as a country in which to invest. One way in
which South Mrica can encourage investment in the shipping industry is to create and
sustain an environment that is investor friendly. As has already been pointed out, the
most internationally recognised and accepted form of ensuring an investor-friendly
shipping fiscal environment is at present the tonnage-based corporate tax. This section
begins by using the neoclassical model of the user cost of capital to analyse and compare
the South Mrican tax environment for the years 1994, 1997, 2000 and under a potential
tonnage tax' regime. It then moves on to calculate an example of how the tonnage tax
would affect government revenues ;.md the tax liability of ships on the South African
register currently owned by Safmarine (Pty) Ltd. Shipping company views on the
tonnage tax are reviewed before turning-t0 '~ist the potential benefits of a tonnage tax to
the South Mrican shipping industry. Finally, this Section investigates additional benefits
of a tonnage tax for South Mrica.
5.1 Analysis of the South African Tax Environment for 1994, 1997, 2000· and
under a Tonnage Tax Regime
On the basis of an investigation of five alternative models of investment carried out in
Section 3, it was decided that for the purposes of this study the theory underlying the
neoclassical model of investment was most appropriate. The theoretical model was
ultimately shown to be ofthe form:
I c ~ [(I - 8}ig + oj x [qll - (JJ x (I - Ijf- k)
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This indicates that the corporate tax system influences the firm's user cost of capital (C)
in several ways. By taxing corporate income, the tax makes devoting resources to capital
investment more expensive, other things being the same. However, depreciation
allowances (lj.r) and investment tax credits (k) tended to lower the user cost. Any change
in the corporation tax system would influence some combination of corporate tax variable
(8), economic depreciation (0), and investment tax credit (k), and hence change the user
cost of capital [see Section 3.3.1 for a revision].
However, since the South African corporate tax system does not allow for investment tax
credit (k), the model used to calculate the user cost of capital for South Africa is:
I C = [(1 - 8}ig + oj x [q/l - OJ x (I - lj.r)
Applying this model to the South Mrican tax environment for the years 1994, 1997 and
2000, we are able to calculate in Table 9 and Table 10, the impact on the user cost of
capital brought about by the changes in the South Mrican tax environment [see Section
4.1].
In order to aid analysis of the effects of changes in the tax and depreciation environment,
it is necessary to hold constant the economic depreciation variable, and the market rate of
interest. Each of the values used for the variables shown in the application of the model
deserve a brief explanation. The asset price variable has been placed at 100 units. The
model can be used with any currency, but there needs to be consistency in that if the
variables are in US dollars (as most ship acquisitions are), then the results must be
interpreted in dollars. Also, the round figure of 100 is convenient for use in
multiplication in the case of fluctuating ship prices, and in terms of interpreting the
results as a percentage ofasset value.
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Table 9: Variables and Results on the User Cost of Capital for South Africa: 1994, 1997,2000 and under a Tonnage Tax..
Case I Asset I Economic I Corporation Market Present value I Investm~nt I Interest I Depreciation I Total




1994 100 0.06 0.35 0.15 0.236919 0 15 9.230769 24.23077 18.49004
1997 100 0.06 0.35 0.15 0.2346509 0 15 9.230769 24.23077 18.545
2000 100 0.06 0.30 0.15 0.2011293 0 15 8.571429 23.57143 18.83052
Tonnage 100 0.06 0.30 of 0.15 0 0 15 6 21 21
Tax fixed orofit
Table 10: Variables and Results on the User Cost of Capital for South Africa: 1994, 1997,2000 and under a Tonnage Tax
Using the Effective Tax Rate
Case I Asset I Economic I Corporation Market Present value I Investme~t I Interest I Depreciation I Total I User Cost of
Price Depreciation Tax rate of of tax credit component component Capital
Rate interest depreciation
allowances
1994 100 0.06 0.422 0.15 0.2857921 0 15 10.38422 25.38422 18.12961
1997 100 0.06 0.422 0.15 0.283056 0 15 10.38422 25.38422 18.19906
2000 100 0.06 0.3778 0.15 0.2532888 0 15 9.643202 24.6432 18.40135
Tonnage 100 0.06 0.30 of 0.15 0 0 15 6 21 21
Tax: fixed orofit
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The prime rate is used as the indication of the market interest rate variable. As of
01/0212000 the prime rate was 14.5 per cent. This is unusually low for South Mrica
since the prime rate has not fallen below 15 per cent since 05/05/1988 [First National
Bank, 2000]. In order to simplify, and add clarity to the model calculations, Table 9 and
Table 10 use the rounded figure of 15 per cent as the market rate of interest. Although
interest rates do vary, the model investigated is static and the calculated results are for the
variables values as indicated in the tables.
Whilst freight rates are the primary influence on ship prices, a second influence on a
ship's value is age. Ceteris paribus, a ten-year-old ship is worth less than a five-year-old
ship. As mentioned in Section 4.1, the normal accounting practice is to depreciate
merchant ships down to scrap over 15 or 20 years. Brokers who value ships take much
the same view, generally using,a'rule.,ofi:u;mmb' that a ship loses 5 or 6 per cent of its
value each year [Stopford, 1997, 101-1O2}: Therefore, it seems reasonable to use either 5
or 6 per cent as the value for the economic depreciation variable to be used in the
neoclassical model of investment.
The present value of depreciation allowances variable for Table 9 and Table lOis
calculated using the accelerated depreciation allowance provided for by the South African
tax legislation [see Section 4.1]. For ships acquired before 1 April 1995 the accelerated
depreciation allowed was 40 per cent in the first year, and 10 per cent thereafter. Ships
acquired on or after 1 April 1995 face a new set of depreciation laws that allow for 20 per
cent straight-line depreciation [Meyerowitz, 1999: 24.4]. The accelerated depreciation,
may be seen as a subsidy, but generally in line both with other South African industries,
and foreign tax practices. Table 11 later investigates the impact of this subsidy on the
user cost ofcapital.
Finally, whilst Table 9 and Table 10 may be interpreted in the same manner, the major
difference between the two tables is that the results of Table 9 are calculated using the
corporate tax rate, whilst the results of Table 10 are calculated using the effective tax rate
[see Table 3 for revision].
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Having reviewed an explanation of, and justification for, the variables used in the model
shown in Table 9 and Table 10, an analysis of the results is in order. Firstly, the interest
component is clearly the same value as the market rate of interest variable which is 15 per
cent. Thus the corporate tax and depreciation laws do not directly affect this value.
Rather it is the market interest rate derived from the macroeconomic context that,
determines the magnitude of this component of the user cost of capital. Therefore, if the
neoclassical model of investment is correct, in general the lower the market rate of
interest, the lower the user cost of capital, and the greater business investment in South
Africa [see Section 3.2 to review alternative views]. Although foreign investors have
access to international capital markets, many South African investors are at a
disadvantage in this respect. As South Africa has been subject to high interest rates, it
would seem necessary that access to international finance be made more easily. available
[see Section 6.1].
The second result is the calculated depreciation component. The depreciation component
should be equal to the economic depreciation variable, that is 6 per cent for Table 9 and
Table 10. However, this is not the case as the depreciation component takes into
consideration both the economic depreciation value, and the corporate tax rate which
raises the user cost of capital as is clearly shown in both Table 9 and Table 10.
So what have been the effects on the user cost of capital of the changes in tax and
depreciation laws for the South African shipping industry? Table 10 is used to explain
how the results may be interpreted from both Table 9 and Table 10. The total column is
calculated as the sum of the interest and depreciation components. Remembering that the
model is looking at changes in the tax and depreciation laws, ceteris paribus, in 1994 and
1997, with an effective tax rate of 42,22 per cent, the total taxation effect for each
US$100 was to add US$25,38 which would mean that ship investment would need an
even higher marginal rate of return in order to be considered as a feasible investment [for
a revision see Section 3.2.2 and 3.4]. Although these figures are the same, the actual user
cost of capital (for the static values given in the model) in 1994 was US$18, 129, whereas
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for 1997 it was US$18,199. The small increase in user cost ofUS$0,07 is attributed to
the change in 1995 of the deprecation laws as noted above.
The year 2000 brought with it a welcome decrease in the corporate tax rate from 35 per
cent to 30 per cent and an associated decrease in the effective tax rate from 42,22 per cent
to 37,78 per cent. How did thisaffectthe U5·er cost of capital? Surprisingly, the user cost
of capital, incorporating accelerated depreciation, further increased to US$18,401. This
represents an increase of more than US$0,2 [as already mentioned, the reader may want
to review Section 3.4].
Rosen [1995: 442] states that "in the neoclassical model, a lump sum tax on the
corporation would have no effect on investment." Thus, as we have established the
tonnage tax to be a lump sum tax [see Section 2.4], in the neoclassical model of the user
cost of capital, the tonnage tax will have no effects on business investment. The
observant reader will have noticed that under a tonnage tax, as shown in·Table:~:O, the
user cost of capital is US$21, far greater than the past and present user cost. It must be
noted however, that some of the main benefits of a tonnage tax are to be found elsewhere
as presented in the rest of Section 5. Also, the US$18 user cost figures have been
calculated with an accelerated depreciation allowance. If we were to look only at the tax
effects on the user cost of capital before any depreciation allowance, then it becomes
clear that the South African tax environment caused the user cost of capital to be
US$25,38 for the years 1994 and 1997, and then to decrease to US$24,64 in 2000 as a
result of the lower tax rate. A key point is that the effective tax rate for 1994 and 1997
raised the user cost of capital by US$4,38. Whereas the present effective tax rate
increases the user cost of capital by a somewhat more modest US$3,64.
In Section 3.3.1 it was stated that in the neoclassical model, firms desire to invest up to
the point where the marginal return to capital assets just equals the opportunity cost of
owning them [Rosen, 1985: 436]. Thus as the shipping industry has generally
experienced low rates of return [Stopford, 1997: 69], the higher the user cost of capital,
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the more difficult the justification for investing in the industry. Conversely, the lower the
user cost ofcapital, the greater the investment in the shipping industry, ceteris paribus.
Boskin's results from his paper entitled: "Tax Policy and the International Location of
Investment" [in Feldstein, 1987:73-80] showed that tax effects on the international
location of investment areimportanL~'Bosk'n finds that tax policies such as accelerated
depreciation and lTC's, which raise the after-tax rate of return on new investment without
losing revenues from previous investment, not only stimulate domestic fixed investment,
but also attract additional investment from abroad. The additional investment
supplements the impact of domestic investment on productivity and raises corporate tax
revenue. However, he warns that his results should be taken as preliminary estimates,
and not as definitive statements about the long-run impacts of tax policy [Boskin in
Feldstein, 1987: 80].
In order to investigate what the effects of a real ship investment would be under the South
African fiscal environment, the case of SA Marine Corporation is used. The SA Shipping
News and Fishing Industry Review [2000: 4], recently reported that SA Marine
Corporation, owned by Capital Finance SA of Greece, had announced a US$200 million
(approximately R1,4 billion) fleet expansion. Newbuilding orders for two Capesize
vessels of 172 000 tonnes, plus options for a further two vessels which were to be
exercised by December 1999, were placed with Hyundai Heavy Industries, while two
Panamax vessels of 75 000 tonnes each were ordered from Daewoo. Contracts were
signed in Athens with the Korean yards during October last year and the vessels will be
delivered in 2001. Stamatis Restis, President of Capital Finance SA [in The SA Shipping
News and Fishing Industry Review, 2000: 4], said:
" These orders d?:monstrate the commitment of our company to expansion ofSA Marine
Corporation and the role of Safbulk and SafOre in the bulk trades ofSouth Africa. We
believe that it is vital that more South African exports are carried by local operators,
increasing not only foreign exchange income, but also invisible earnings; creating job
opportunities and expanding the SA skills base in the bulk business. "
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These and other benefits as discussed in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 can be attributed to
an expansion of the South African shipping industry. If the SA Marine Corporation
investment in fleet expansion were to take place under the South African fiscal
environment, what would be the observed impact of the distortionary effects on the user
cost of capital?
Under the present South African tax environment with the assumption of 5 per cent
economic depreciation and a market interest rate of 15 per cent as shown in Table 11,
Case 1, it can be seen that if market forces are allowed to prevail, without the
distortionary effects of taxation and depreciation, the user cost would be US$20 as is seen
in the case of the tonnage tax (T. Tax) scenario. However, when the distorting effect of
taxation is taken into account it further increases the user cost by more than US$3 to
US$23,04.
In Section 2.4, it was stated that subsidies create excess burden because they encourage
people to consume goods valued less than the marginal social cost of production.
Accelerated depreciation may be viewed as a subsidy to the shipping industry. Case 1,
2000a shows that the accelerated depreciation allowance lowers the user cost by US$5,84
to US$17,20. One might at first be inclined to consider the US$5,84 as the subsidy given
by the government to the ship investor. However, in South Africa, if capital does not fall
under an accelerated depreciation allowance, the law still makes allowances for economic
depreciation. Case 1, 2000b calculates the user cost of capital using the real econ.omic
depreciation. The difference between the user cost calculated in 2000a with accelerated
depreciation, and 2000b without the accelerated depreciation subsidy is US$3,11. What









100 0.05 0.3778 0.15 0.2532888 0 15 8.036001 23.036 17.20124
100 0.05 0.3778 0.15 0.1182388 0 15 8.036001 23.036 20.31225
100 0.05 Lump sum 0.15 0 0 15 5 20 20
100 0.05 0.3778 0.24 0.2074412 0 24 8.036001 32.036 25.39041
100 0.05 0.3778 0.24 0.0776428 0 :24 8.036001 32.036 29.54864
100 0.05 Lump sum 0.24 0 0 24 5 29 29
100 0.06 Lump sum 0.15 0 0.20 151 61 211 16.8
100 0.06 0.3778 0.05 0.3271353 0 5 I 9.643202 I 14.6432 I 9.852894
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Therefore, if the SA Marine Corporation investment in fleet expansion were to have an
asset price of US$200 million, and take place under the present South African fiscal
environment as outlined in Case 1, the end result would show that the user cost of capital
would be US$40,63 million (see 2000b) of which the government would have to
subsidise through accelerated depreciation US$6,22 million (approximately R43,54
million). This result is not unique to investment in shipping, and a similar exercise could
be carried out for many other South African industries with an accelerated depreciation
allowance.
At its peak on the 2/09/98, the prime rate in South Africa was 24 per cent. What would
be the effect of a sustained higher interest rate on the user cost of capital, the government
subsidy, and on ship investment in South Africa? Case 2 may be interpreted in a similar
manner as Case 1 was, however Case 2 uses an interest rate of 24 per cent to investigates
the impact of a sustained high interest rate on the user cost of capital and the government
subsidy. Notice that in comparing Case 1 with Case 2, the depreciation component
showing the tax effect is the same, it is only the interest rate that has caused a direct
increase ofUS$9 (due to 15-24 per cent interest rates) in the Total column for the user
cost of capital. The government subsidy, has increased from the US$3,11 under Case 1
to US$4,16 in Case 2. This means that as the interest rate rises and becomes more of a
burden on ship investment, so the subsidisation of ship investment may become a greater
burden for the government. Again, these findings are applicable not only to ship
investment, but also other industries afforded accelerated depreciation.
In contrast, under a tonnage tax system (if no allowances for depreciation are allowed),
the economic depreciation and market determined interest rate dictate the user cost. Both
Case 1 and Case 2 show the user cost under such a tonnage tax (T.Tax) system to be
lower than what the user cost of capital would be under a South African tax law which
does not support ship investment through a subsidy like accelerated depreciation.
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Case 3 shows a scenario in which the tonnage tax is used with an investment tax credit of
20 per cent. This case shows how the user,cost under a tonnage tax might look with a 20
per cent ITC. Sensitivity testing with the neoclassical model shows the effect of an
investment tax credit of say 20 per cent to have the same effect on the user cost as an
accelerated depreciation allowance of 20 per cent. However, whilst the effect on the user
cost of both measures seems to be the same, the author is doubtful that industries would
consider both these forms of government subsidisation in a similar light. In addition, in
the tonnage tax countries, accelerated depreciation has been done away with as a part of
the new system of taxation [see Section 4.2].
Finally, Case 4 shows what happens when say either the interest rate falls to 5 per cent,
which is most unlikely for South Mrica at this point in time, or, if an investor were able
to gain access to international capital markets and in this way be able to finance the
investment at a 5 per cent interest rate, ceteris paribus. In such a scenario as Case 4, the
taxation effect plays a larger role for the ship investor. Under a tonnage tax the user cost
of capital would have been US$9, whereas South Mrica's present effective tax effect
would have caused the user cost to increase to US$14,64. Even with the accelerated
depreciation subsidy of20 per cent per annum, the user cost is still shown to be 0.85 units
higher than under a tonnage tax system.
In summary, under the neoclassical model of investment we see that the lower the user
cost of capital, the greater the investment in the shipping industry, ceteris paribus. This
section has shown that a change in the accelerated depreciation laws to the present 20 per
cent straight-line depreciation caused only a slight increase in the user cost of capital.
Without the impact of accelerated depreciation included, the decrease in the corporate tax
rate from 35 per cent to 30 per cent, and the corresponding maximum effective tax rates,
caused a decrease in the user cost of capital. Due to the nature of the neoclassical model
however, contrary to what might be expected, the decrease in tax rates, taken together
with the depreciation allowance, further increased the user cost. It was shown that
accelerated depreciation may be viewed as a subsidy, and a hypothetical example of fleet
expansion by SA Marine Corporation under the present South Mrican tax laws showed
75
the potential magnitude of this subsidy. The effects of a sustained higher interest rate on
the user cost of capital, the government subsidy and ultimately on ship investment in
South Africa were investigated. It was shown that with a sustained higher interest rate,
the user cost of capital is increased proportionately, which deters ship investment. Also,
as the interest rate increases, so the subsidy increases, thereby lowering the user cost and
making ship investment more attractive. Further sensitivity testing with the model under
alternative scenarios revealed that the effect on user cost of a 20 per cent investment tax
credit is the same as a 20 per cent present value of depreciation allowance. Finally, Case
4 showed that taxation has a greater distortionary impact on the user cost under a low
interest rate environment. In this case it was shown that even with an accelerated
depreciation allowance of 20 per cent per annum, the user cost is still higher under the
present system of taxation than under a tonnage tax system. Even so, many of the more
important benefits of a tonnage tax may be found to lie elsewhere [see Section 5.2,
Section 5.4 and Section 5.5]. This Section has used the neoclassical model of investment
to investigate the effects past, present and potential tonnage tax on the user cost of
capital. Section 5.2 now calculates an exercise using South African Marine Corporation
to contrast the present tax liability of a typical liner ship with that under a tonnage tax
system.
5.2 Tonnage Tax Example with South African Marine Corporation
Much of the information on SA Marine Corporation contained in this section comes from
answers to questions posed to Mr. Heesom-Green on the Trade Development Executive
ofSafmarine [Interview 2].
During 1999, the SA Marine Corporation was divided into a number of separate parts
each sold-off to buyers independent ofeach other:
• The container line activities were branded Safmarine and sold to A.P.
M011er/Maersk Group (ofDenmark).
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• The towage/salvage activities were sold to Smit as Smit Pentow Marine (of
Holland).
• The reefer operations (Cool Carriers) were sold to Hoegh ofNorway.
• The bulk operations (now incorporated as SA Marine Corporation) were disposed
of to Enterprises Shipping Capital Finance S.A. of Greece.
• The shareholding in Unicorn Lines was sold to Grindrod Unicorn.
Safmarine Container lines carries some 400 000 TEUs (twenty-foot-equivalent-units) per
annum on deep sea trades and has an operated fleet of some 40 container vessels. Only
six of these vessels, however, are owned by Safmarine (Pty) Ltd and fly the South
African flag. Unfortunately, the tonnage of cargo carried by these six ships is not
possible to determine accurately as the six owned vessels are operated in trades
(Europe/Saecs and Far East/Safari) with partner lines as part of Safmarine's vessel
contribution to these trades which also include vessels from the partner lines (such as
P&O Nedlloyd). Safmarine's and the partner lines cargo is carried on all vessels within
the respective Conference services. Consequently, it is not possible to determine the
freight revenues generated by the South African flagged vessels as freight revenues are
earned by Safmarine on all of its cargo regardless of which vessel carries the cargo
[Interview 2].
Ideally, the author would have liked to make a comparison of the present shipping related
taxes paid to the Receiver of Revenue by Safmarine to those that would have been paid
under a tonnage tax. That exercise was not possible as the six South African vessels are
an integrated part of the total fleet of 40 vessels, all of which are employed on
Safmarine's global container trades. As such it is not possible to isolate the revenue,
costs and net profits related to those six vessels alone [Interview 2].
Although the actual revenues, costs and net profit figures for the South African Safmarine
registered ships are not available, a synthetic exercise, based on reasonable assumptions,
was conducted to determine what could be the approximate revenues, profitability and tax
liability of a typical liner ship under the present system of taxation in South Africa.
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Table 12 shows the typical TEU (twenty-foot-equivalent-unit) prices of both outward and
inward bound containers on the three main liner trade routes.




[Interview 2 and Interview 3]
For the purposes of this exercise, we will calculate the approximate freight revenue
earned by a typical liner vessel, for in~tance Safmarine's SA Helderberg. Th~ SA
Helderberg operates on the European trade route. Taking an average TEU rate from
Table 12 for the European trade route, we can assume an average rate of US$1 200.
Typically, the liner ship would be able to conduct approximately 15 voyages within a
year, and has the capacity to carry about 2 900 boxes per voyage. If we assume a
capacity utilisation of 80 per cent [Interview 2], we are able to calculate a rough estimate
of total revenue per year:
(No. voyages p.a.) x (total capacity) x (capacity utilisation) x (US$ per box) =
(Approximate total revenue)
15 x 2.900 x 0.80 x US$I,200 = US$41 760000
Thus the total revenue earned by the SA Helderberg under the above realistic
assumptions is approximately US$42 million. Historically, profits and rates of return on
investment have been considered low for the shipping industry [Stopford, 1997: 69], but
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assuming, say, a 10 per cent operating profit [from Interview 2 and Interview 3 and in
line with the estimates in Stopford for the UK 1970 to 1990 period], this means that
taxable income generated by this vessels activities would be US$4,2 million. At the
present company tax rate of 30 per cent, the tax calculates to be US$1,26 million (or
approximately R8,82 million).
The company's tax liability arising from the vessel's activities however may not be as
high as this because of the influence of accelerated depreciation allowances early in the
life of the vessel. There is also provision for a tax loss to be carried forward thus
extending the tax shield. However, all of the South African flagged vessels are well
beyond any potential accelerated depreciation benefits, and for a ship like the SA
Helderberg which was completed in 1977, the risk of a deferred liability crystallising,
which might otherwise occur if the company does not continue with its investment
programme is very real, and thus the advantages of a tonnage tax regime are more
appealing.
Alternatively, under a tonnage tax system, what would be the tax liability of a ship like
the SA Helderberg? In Section 4.2.2, Table 4 showed the Dutch tonnage tax profits per
day. The British used this figure as the rate which they would use to ensure a competitive
tax environment, and converted the rate into Pounds. Likewise, using an approximated
average exchange rate of RlO,50 to the Pound, for the first quarter of 2000, Table 13
generates what the South Mrican tonnage tax rate could look like [rounded off to the
nearest cent], if the same formulae were to be followed.
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Table 13: Tonnage Tax Rates for South Africa, Britain and the Netherlands
- up to 1,000 tons HFL 2.00 £ 0.60 R6.30
- between 1,000 HFL 1.50 £ 0.45 R4.73
and 10,000 tons
- between 10,000 HFL 1.00 £ 0.30 R3.15
and 25,000 tons
- above 25,000 HFL 0.50 £ 0.15 R 1.58
tons
[Dutch rates from van Niekerk, 199'7: Appendix, British rates from Inland Revenue,
1999]
Thus under the tonnage tax system, a ship, such as the SA Helderberg, with a net
registered tonnage of 16879, is liable for the following annual tax:




With the determination of the tonnage tax, neither the actual turnover nor the associated
costs of the shipping company will be taken into account, which means tax revenue
irrespective of profits or costs. The annual tonnage tax liability of the SA Helderberg, as
calculated in Table 13, would be approximately R77 240.
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In comparing the tax liability resulting from a ship such as the SA Heldrberg under the
alternative tax systems, it is clear that the annual tax liability (using the assumptions of
the exercise above) may vary from between zero tax liability to R8,4 million per annum
(without the benefit of depreciation or deferred losses). In contrast, under a tonnage tax,
the tax liability or revenue received by the government from the SA Helderberg would be
a definite R77 240 per annum. As we saw with the case of Norway in Section 4.4.2,
government revenues from the tax levied on shipowners have actually increased since the
implementation of the tonnage tax.
One might question what happens when the Company makes an overall loss? Despite
recording a record R66 million loss for 1999 (R27 million profit in 1998) the Durban-
based shipowner and operator Grincor was confident it would soon return to profitability
[SA Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review, 2000: 6]. Since a tonnage tax is
independent of whether a company makes a profit or loss, under such circumstances, if
the company had elected into a tonnage tax, the tax would have to be paid. Although,
assuming the aim of the firm is to make a profit, a loss may be considered an exception to
the rule.
For a vessel such as the SA Helderberg, the total taxable income would have to be lower
than R257 466 per annum in order for the present tax system to offer a lower liability
than under a tonnage tax. This effectively translates into a profit rate of 0,8 per cent.
Thus the tonnage tax system is appealing at all but very low profit levels.
Heesom-Green [Interview 2] believes:
... it could be argued that a simple South African tonnage tax system levied on the South
African owned/operated vessel would be appropriate for a complex, international
business such as container shipping.
In terms of government revenue, over a period of five years, the fiscus will receive R386
199 compared to potentially no tax revenue for the first five years the with existing
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depreciation allowances for new ship investment. Thus, as an indication of government
revenue, for the six commercial ships at present on the South African Ships' Register, the
fiscus would have received R4 446 285 [see Table 14] over the nine year period under a
tonnage tax system.
Thus although the level of tax payments that many companies currently pay may not be
significantly affected in practice, a tonnage tax enables the company to have the benefits
of certainty, flexibility, clarity and competitiveness [see Section 4.2.2] in a highly
cyclical and volatile industry. Also, as mentioned above, it removes the risk of a deferred
liability crystallising; investment can be undertaken on a commercial basis and does not
form the basis for virtual tax-exemption; and tax considerations do not provide artificial
incentives for the existence of diversified groups [see Section 5.4.1 for further fiscal
benefits].
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Table: 15: Government Revenue from a Tonnage Tax Exercise over the Period 1992 to 2000
II~ ,,9 \:·9, ..
16879 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466
16879 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466
16879 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466
16879 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466 257466
10192 180137 180137 180137 180137 180137 180137 180137 180137 180137
9432 145574 145574 145574 145574 145574 145574 145574 145574 145574
1355575 1355575 1355575 1355575 1355575 1355575 1355575 1355575 1355575
48% 40% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 30%
650676 542230 474451 474451 474451 474451 474451 474451 406673
The above are nominal revenues received by government and taxes paid by shippers.
Above Table is calculated from conversion of British rates by using realistically assumed exchange rate from first quarter of 2000 at R1 0.50 per
Pound.
[Adapted from van Niekerk, 1997: 11].
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5.3 Shipping Company Views on Tonnage Tax
The working meeting held 1 September 1997 [van Niekerk, 1997: 6] believed that under
the right circumstances, it was possible for South Africa not only to recover the shipping
business that has been located off-shore, but also to attract new investors including those
who confirmed their genuine interest at the meeting. These circumstances will be
facilitated if policy is created with an aim to 'level the playing field' for South African
shipowners and operators.
Applying the arguments for Britain to the case of the South African shipping industry, it is
clear that action is needed because of:
• the increasing trend towards cross-national companies, where the South Mrican
partner is competing with a partner in another country which treats shipping more
favourably;
• ever growing shortages of well qualified seafarers; and
• imminent decisions by companies on location, employment and registration.
These views were supported by the National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping
Transport Officers (NUMAST): "The tonnage-based tax is of critical importance to our
industry and, we believe, to providing the environment that will stop the haemorrhaging of
our maritime skills and the decline of our merchant fleet." The Rail and Maritime
Transport union (RMT): "sees the tonnage tax as essential to assisting the revival of
British shipping" [Lord Alexander, 1999: pt. 29].
As the South African government has no official position on the tonnage tax, the view of
the DETR (Lord Alexander, 1999: pt. 30) is considered below:
Without a tonnage tax it seems likely that any new investment and much existing
shipping business will be lost to the UK; indeed, the indications are that this
process could happen relatively qUickly as those companies which have held
investment decisions pending finally "jump ship". Without securing a Significant
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UK industry there seems little prospect ofdeveloping the maritime skills base and
employment ... In short, a tonnage tax is widely regarded as integral to the success
of the Government's shipping policy. If we fail to create an appropriate
environment for British shipping, the;.imlustry - both shipowners and unions - will
consider that we have defaulted on our side of the partnership. In these
circumstances, we believe that there would be a poor prospect of securing the
objectives set out in "Charting a new course. "
The DETR supported this argument by pointing out that after the withdrawal of 100%
first-year capital allowances against corporation tax in 1984 the tonnage of UK direct-
owned ships fell by over 20% in two years. Tonnage has further dropped by 25% over the
past three years following the introduction of tonnage tax regimes elsewhere in Europe.
These examples appear to demonstrate neatly the importance of fiscal competition [Lord
Alexander, 1999: pt. 31]. The' DETR"s'Tcpresentatives confirmed to Lord Alexander
[1999, pt. 31] that a more attractive fiscal environment was critical and that the only
proposal that had been made to achieve this was the tonnage tax.
The importance of a competitive fiscal regime is confirmed by the submission of P&O to
Lord Alexander [1999: pt. 33]. They draw attention to the rationalisation taking place
among shipping companies seeking to develop worldwide operations and enhance their
scale of activity. Pressures from partners are necessarily driving such merged activities to
locate in the most favourable tax environments. In 1996 P&O merged their container
business with the Dutch major Royal Nedlloyd to form P&O Nedlloyd, a UK parent
company, with Dutch and UK operating companies. This conflated company is now the
second largest container carrier in world shipping, behind Maersk-Sealand, yet another
merged global operation [Interview 3]. Inevitably, the incentive is to locate new
investment by the combined group in the most favourable tax regime. P&O indicated that
expansion of their partnership was under active consideration. Prospective partners would
currently not expect the parent company to be in a "full tax" regime or any part of the
shipping profit to be subject to UK tax. They would wish to ensure that the e».isting
shipping profits were not subject to corporation tax, to prevent a tax liability arising on
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dividends paid up to a parent company from overseas subsidiaries, and to guard against
UK tax on newly merged activities as a result of a British participant. P&O and Royal
Nedlloyd have stated an intention to seek a listing for P&O Nedlloyd and say that a
structure which· is internationally competitive is a prerequisite. In the view of P&O, all
these considerations would mean thaLSouth Mrica's current tax, regime we"lld be
. perceived as comparatively unfavourable :as was Britain's tax regime. As Lord Alexander
[1999, pt.: 33]ar~L1es, "this would result 111 pressure towardslocating~management and
,«' ,investment overseas.?~:One,mightbetemptedto consider the 'corollary which would mean
that if South Africa fulfils the above conditions, management ;and -investment would be
tempted to locate in South Mrica. However, the author would like to point out that whilst
fulfilment of the .above considerations might be' considered necessary. for South Mrica to
., y ,-encourageinvestment;: compliance with the~above-is ,not -sufficient to :ensure·investml~nt in
- .the ,South -, African shipping industry; ',~There_,are- many;, other :Jactors that -- determine
- ;. investment,_some of which arediscussed:in Section 5.1 and Section 6.1.
,,_, In June of 1998, it was reported [Fairplay; 1998e:.9] that',Finnish shipping leaders were
increasing pressure on the·government-foY' {:ax reforms in the lead up to the 1999 draft
~. .
budget. They were demanding that the Finnish government followed the example of the
Netherlands and Norway and adopt a tonnage tax. Finnlines managing director Andy
Lagerroos asserted. that: "It is essential for"the· competitiveness :'and future of Finnish
shipping that the European trend is followed in Finland" [Fairplay, 1998e: 9]. As noted in
Section 4.4, the Finnish Government has, responded to this pressure by agreeing to
introduce the tonnage tax in a move to stop the paemorrhage of ships from the ni:t'tional
flag.
In South Africa, Captain Dave Rennie, Chief Executive of Unicorn Lines [IntervIew 7]
expressed suppo~, for initiatives like that ,vi a tOlmage tax; however, he highlights the
issue of motive. The motivation for a tOlmage tax must not be revenue, but rather
employment for South Africa within the maritime industry and for South African
seafarers. He feels a tonnage tax alone would not have much effect, and that South Afi"ica
needs to create and promote an environment that is conducive to shipowning. Our
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discussion brought to the fore a number of other factors which affect where an owner or
operator decides to register a ship. These conditions included: the country's geographic
location, communication, infrastructure, a facilitating legal environment and the
availability of skills, or the ease with which one can acquire them from overseas.
Interestingly, he also adds that as tax havel1;fand flags of convenience are under scrutiny,. . . .
he does not think that the tonnage tax will last [Interview 7]. In contrast, this view may be
questioned, in that even though tax havens and flags of convenience have been under
scrutiny for many decades, more than half the world fleet is registered in these countries
[see Table 5], and it would seem that there has been little success in persuading investors
not to registering their vessels in such countries. Also, with respect to the permanency of
the tonnage tax, the nature of the international shipping industry, the current international
trends, and the tonnage tax legislation itself, leads the author to believe that the tonnage
tax will endure, and indeed spread as countries seek to level the playing field and make
their shipping industry's more internationally competitive.
It is clear from· these extracts that the industry favours the increasingly fashionable
tonnage tax. But why, given that the present previous British, and present South Mrican
tax structure produces such a low effective tax charge, does the industry regard it as so
essential? The first reason concerns the nature of the fiscal environment which it would
create. The second relates to the sustenance of a climate of partnership between business,
trades unions and the Government to regenerate shipping.
Heesom-Green, Trade Development Executive for Safmarine [Interview 2 and see Section
5.2], favours a tonnage tax for the sector of the industry with which he is familiar and
says:
... it could be argued that a simple South African Tonnage tax system levied on the South
African owned/operated vessel would be appropriate for a complex, international
business such as container shipping.
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5.4 Potential Benefits of a Tonnage Tax to the South African Shipping Industry
Section 4 showed that there is an international trend of countries adopting a tonnage tax
system as an important component of their shipping policies. Many governments have
initially been reluctant to implement a tonnage tax regime, but have ultimately conceded
to the pressure and needs of their shipping sectors. So why does the shipping industry
regard a tonnage tax as so essential? There are many potential benefits to a shipping
industry of operating under a tonnage tax system, which can be discussed under two
separate headings: the fiscal environment, and partnerships.
5.4.1 The Fiscal Environment
For many companies the tonnage regime,,,nay not significantly affect the "level of tax
payments. Their liabilities may currently be deferred indefinitely if a high enough level of
investment is maintained. Instead, as noted by the Lord Alexander Report [1999: pt. 38], it
would appear that the tonnage tax would have particular structural advantages for shipping
over the existing corporation tax system, on the grounds that:
• it benefits the profit and loss accounts and balance sheets because there is no
deferred tax liability. For public companies, it would directly increase earnings
per share, which is an important yardstick by which performance is judged, to the
extent of what would, under the existing regime, have been a provision for
deferred tax; [see Section 6.1]
• investment can be undertaken on a commercial basis and does not form the basis
for virtual tax-exemption, and tax considerations do not provide artificial
incentives for the existence of diversified groups;
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• it brings certainty and clarity about costs and liabilities. It is argued that investors
and analysts would more readily be able to understand the tonnage tax and would
find it more attractive;
• it removes the risk of a deferred liability crystallising, which might otherwise
occur if the company does not continue with its investment programme or if
accounting principles are changed to require even more prudence than currently
required; and
• depending on its design, it would facilitate international structures and
arrangements not least by providing a level playing field between partners so
enabling the centre of gravity of partnership activities to be located in South
Mrica.
All these are cogent advantages that may well be more important to the perception of
South Africa as a tax-friendly environment than the simple difference in the level of tax
payable. The tonnage tax has widespread support within the international shipping
industry as a sensible and pragmatic way of achieving a low-tax regime for shipping but
also offering some other important advantages. The industry stresses that the cost of the
change need not be high and the advantages are principally structural [Lord Alexander,
-1999: pt. 39].
5.4.2 Partnership
If a revival of the South Mrican shipping industry is tobe successful, there is a need for a
potent and committed partnership between the Government, business and trades unions in
order to strengthen the industry. Jones [1987 and Jones and Kennedy 1991] identify a
need for the promotion of "sea-mindedness" in the trading community. They note shipper
attitudes of relative indifference towards a greater involvement with the sea transp'Jrt of
their products as a serious stumbling block in the path of a larger role for South Mrican
carriers. All of the relevant parties should aim for a package of measures that makes
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South Mrica's shipping industry internationally competitive. Government, in partnership
with business and the trade unions needs to create a package of measures to ensure that
South Africa is able to take advantage of the present environment and reap the benefits of
a more internationally competitive industry. Conversely, it seems probable that many
sectors would lose conviction that the Government is truly committed if it were to reject a
fiscal incentive like the tonnage tax. A shipping policy without a fiscal incentive "would
be perceived to be holed below the waterline before it left port" [Lord Alexander, 1999:
pt. 40].
5.5 Additional Benefits of a Tonnage Tax for South Africa
Aside from the potentially substantial .increase In tax revenues received by the
Government if additional tonnage is attracted to the national shipping industry [see
Section 5.2], the supportive views of the international and South African shipping industry
[in Section 5.3], -and the specific benefits to the shipping industry as set out above, there
are still further benefits to South Mrica which are discussed in this section.
South Africa has done little analysis into the benefits of a tonnage tax, but in Britain, the
DETR concluded "on balance that the economic case for the tonnage tax is sound" [Lord
Alexander, 1999: pt. 65]. According to a report produced by Bimco and the International
Shipping Federation [in Lloyd's Daily Shipping Report, 2000], worldwide demand for
seafarers in 2000 was estimated at 420,000 officers and 599 000 ratings. The supply
figures were put at 404,000 officers and 823,000 ratings. This implies a shortfall of
16,000 or 4 per cent in officer numbers, and a total excess of 224,000 ratings, some 27 per
cent above requirements. Predictions for the future are predicated on the conservative
assumptions that the number of ships in the world fleet will grow at 1 per cent per annum,
and that recruitment and outflow remain at the level seen over the last five years. On this
basis, there will be a shortage of 46,000 officers, or 12 per cent, by 2010, while the excess
of ratings will increase to 255,000, or 30 per cent in that same year.
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The clear message is that the current moderate shortage for officers will worsen unless
training is increased or measures are taken to address the rate at which seafarers leave
the industry [Lloyd's Daily Shipping Report, 2000].
Understood in this context, the key to revival of the British industry is seen as more direct
UK ownership of shipping leading to more training of UK seafarers, especially officers,
with consequent substantial benefit to the shore-based related industries. They envisaged
that there would be more registration of vessels which is likely, in turn, to increase the
employment ofboth officers and ratings [Lord Alexander, 1999: pt. 65].
In South Mrican, the economy differs fundamentally from the economIes of many
traditional maritime nations and indeed, most developed countries, by having an absence
of maritime protectionist measures directed specifically at the industry, as well as a vast
pool of unemployed labour. With an increasing unemployment rate, and official
unemployment figures in 1998 of over 25,2%, and an expanded unemployment rate of
37,5%, measures that bring about substantial reduction in unemployment are
indispensable [Statistics South Mrica, 2000. 3-5]. Reliance on the presently structured
South African market alone is unlikely to stimulate the economic growth to absorb even
the existing unemployment. It is therefore essential that the Government facilitate job
creation wherever such opportunities may exist. The prospects for generating
employment in the maritime related industries afford one such opportunity.
South Africa arguably has a comparative advantage in that it has relatively cheap labour in
terms of officers (for which there is a world shortage), and shore-based labour, which
provides an additional incentive to re-Iocate companies to operate from South Africa. The
Working Group [1995: 7] stated that "South Mrica's shipping policy is more liberal than
protectionistic which has resulted in an efficient shipowning and operating sector. This
sector has capacity for substantial growth." This growth, however, needs to be facilitated
by the South African government in order to create a level playing field for South African
shipowners and operators.
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The arguments for a tonnage tax would be less potent if subsidies and tax concessions for
the industry elsewhere were only temporary. The value of preserving an industry during a
stormy period until it could flourish in a non-distortionary environment with its
comparative edge would be high. But it is unrealistic to suppose that internationally
shipping industry subsidies and tax concessions will be eliminated in the near future to
level the playing field. What these treasures do suggest however, is that if our industry is
granted a package of measures which enable it to compete with other countries it will be
better positioned to compete successfullyin the international shipping markets.
Government's policy was clearly to "render(ing) the business environment for shipowning
on the South African Ships' Register more favourable to new investment from abroad and
to induce the repatriation of ships owned directly or indirectly by South African
companies" [van Niekerk, 1997: 1]. This involves seeking a more effective, user~friendly
way of creating a more benign fiscal regime, and the tonnage tax seems to be the most
internationally accepted way of doing so [Lord Alexander, 1999: pt. 71]. Lord Alexander
[1999: pt. 72] concludes for the British industry that:
All the material that I have seen convinces me that without improving the fiscal
environment with a firm and swift commitment to a tonnage tax the chance of success of
that policy [to revive the shipping industry} will be minimal.
The current high mobility of international shipping firms creates opportunities for South
Africa which will not last forever. By ensuring that the maritime environment allows
South African businesses to operating on a level playing field, South Africa might not
only recover the shipping business that has been located offshore, but may attract new
investors including those who confirmed their genuine interest at the working meeting
held on 1 September 1997 [van Niekerk, 1997]. With sixty South African-owned ships
registered off-shore and four potential new shipowners, South Africa could gain the
registration of some one hundred ships. With a crew of approximately 25 each, direct job
opportunities for 5000 or more seafarers would be created, apart from the employment of
those who indirectly derive their living from seafaring. Seafarers often leave their
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employment after three years at sea, which could mean that some 10 000 workers would
be trained over a period often years [van Niekerk, 1997: 6].
Some of the secondary benefits identified by van Niekerk [1997: 6 and others like Jones
and Kennedy, 1991] which would ensue from the expansion of the shipping industry
include:
• savings in foreign exchange when cargo is carried in domestic ships instead of
foreign ships;
• increased foreign earnings from domestic ships trading between foreign countries;
• increased foreign earnings from the remittances of domestic seafarers who take up
employment on foreign ships; and
• increased domestic investment by foreign shipowners or operators relocating to the
country.
• increased employment opportunities in ancillary industries associated, inter alia,
with ship finance, shipbroking and crew supply.
Also, recall from Section 1 that this country's share of world seaborne trade exceeds its
share of world shipping supply by a factor of more than 20 to one, with the result that the
bulk of the commodities handled in South African ports are carried in foreign-owned and
foreign-controlled ships. Jones [1991: 1] points out that "a clear consequence of this is
that a high percentage of the sub-continent's sea freight payments accrues to foreign
shipowners, a situation which is immediately apparent from the shape of the services
account of the South African balance of payments." Thus should these expansionary
expectations be realised, there is every reason to anticipate that the already powerful
positive net impact of the shipping industry on the balance of payments [Jones, 1991: 9]
will be further strengthened.
Adopting a tonnage tax may be able to level the playing field not only for shipowners, but
also ship operators. Floor [1993: 5.1.60] states that ship operators will invariably earn
foreign exchange for South Africa when their businesses are successful. The amount will
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be equivalent to the difference between their payments in foreign currencies for time
charters, fuel and port services, and their freight income in foreign currencies. Foreign
exchange will also be saved when voyages are undertaken for local shippers, who
otherwise would transact with foreign owners or operators, and payment is received in
Rands. While ship operators do not create direct employment for local seafarers, their
activities do lead to other employment in the maritime community.
The environmental argument, now routinely deployed in support of so many causes, has
been argued by Lord Alexander [1999: pt. 48] to be fairly slight in this case. Significant
environmental benefits could only be achieved he argues, by transporting more goods by
sea than by road. He further asserts that "the tonnage tax is not designed to achieve this
and I have seen.no evidence that it would do so." In South Africa, however, there is
coastal competition between road, rail and sea transport for domestic and regional carriers,
but its impact on deepsea activity is minimal [see Jones, 1997: 55-67 and Jones 1992: 7-
13]. Further research will have to be carried out in this respect in order to establish the
impact of a tonnage tax on the share of goods carries by land or sea [see Section 6.2].
Furthermore, since nearly all major maritime environmental "incidents" are associated
with ships registered under flags of convenience, a move towards safer national flags
could have significant environmental advantages [see McConville, 1999: 209-241 for a
discussion on the economics of safety in shipping].
The British have linked their tonnage tax with a minimum training obligation which will
require the practical training or sponsorship of a specified number of new cadets each
year. Presently, South African companies are faced with the skills training levy which
could perhaps be adapted for similar purposes to ensure a pool of skilled South African
seafarers. Van Niekerk [1997: 3] notes that the most important circumstance must be a
pool of South Mrican seafarers for employment at wages which afford their employers
cost advantages in the international market for shipping. If the employment prospects are
able to be realised, then "substantial employment for South African seafarers can be
created at little or no cost to the Government" [van Niekerk, 1997: 3]. Not only will jobs
be created for seafarers, but also within the land based maritime industry. If this is the
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case, then every effort should be made to create an environment for shipowners and
operators that will facilitate ship registration and administration for national and
international investors.
Thus a key determinant as to whether a tonnage tax will benefit South Africa lies in the
policy's ability to strengthen and expand South African shipowners and operators. For it
is through the strengthening and expansion of this sector of the shipping industry that the
benefits reviewed above, and the potential for increased job creation will be achieved.
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6 Conclusions
God must have been a shipowner. He placed the raw materials far from where they were
needed and covered two thirds ofthe earth with water.
[Erling Naess, in Stopford, 1997: 291]
At present more than 70 per cent of the international shipping industry operates without
paying normal income tax, and in addition, the shipping industry is considered more
sensitive to the level of taxation than others owing to the enormous cost of ship
replacement. There was a time in the 1980's when the South African fiscal policy
environment was considered supportive and broadly comparable with the tax and
incentives facing western shipowners, but the international shipping arena has moved on,
leaving South African shipowners and operators to compete internationally on an
inequitable fiscal basis. South Africa's re-entry into the international mainstream trading
community has the potential. to create opportunities for a strengthening and expansion of
the country's maritime community and the related benefits, but these opportunities need to
be facilitated, most importantly through a levelling of the playing field. One way of
helping to achieve this could be through the introduction of a tonnage tax that has been
accepted and adopted internationally. This paper has investigated the potential benefits of
a tonnage-based corporate tax for South Mrica and the South African shipping industry.
The paper provided a background and context in which the aims, objectives and
methodology could be understood. It provided a brief review of economic theory and
principles underlying the shipping industry, as well as the necessary corporate tax
concepts and perspectives. Section 3 then investigated five investment theories that
explain the effects of corporate taxation on business investment. The section concluded
that the neoclassical model of investment would be used to analyse the effects of the
South Mrican corporate tax environment on the user cost of capital. Section 4, gave a
critical review of the South Mrican tax environment, and argued that the present tax
structure in the context of the international shipping arena is unsatisfactory. Accelerated
depreciation provisions embody an element of subsidy, yield comparatively little tax, and
in traditional policy frameworks offers little to attract companies or investors. The section
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then continued to investigate the alternative tonnage-based corporate tax system, and an
international review of the incidence of tonnage tax was conducted.
Section 5 investigated the potential benefits of a tonnage tax to South Mrica and the South
Mrican shipping industry in some detail. Under the neoclassical model of investment we
saw that the lower the user cost of capital, the greater the investment in the shipping
industry, ceteris paribus. Section 5.1 showed that a change in the accelerated depreciation
laws to the present 20 per cent straight-line depreciation caused only a slight increase in
the user cost of.<capital. Without the impact of accelerated depreciation included, the
decrease in 2000 of the corporate tax rate from 35 per cent to 30 per cent, and the
corresponding maximum effective tax rates, caused a decrease in the user cost of capital.
Due to the nature of the neoclassical model however, contrary to what might be expected,
the decrease in tax rates, taken together with the depreciation allowance, further increased
the user cost. It was shown that accelerated depreciation may be viewed as a subsidy, and
a hypothetical example of fleet expansion by SA Marine Corporation under the present
South African tax laws showed the potential magnitude of this subsidy. The effects of a
sustained higher interest rate on the user cost of capital, the government subsidy and
ultimately on ship investment in South Mrica were investigated. It was shown that with a
sustained higher interest rate, the user cost :)f capital is increased proportionately which
deters ship investment, and as the interest rate increases, so the subsidy increases. This
lowers the user cost and makes ship investment more attractive. Further sensitivity testing
with the neoclassical model under alternative scenarios revealed that the effect on user
cost of a 20 per cent investment tax credit is the same as a 20 per cent present value of
depreciation allowance. Finally, it was shown that taxation has a greater distortionary
impact on the user cost under a low interest rate environment. In this case it was &hown
that even with an accelerated depreciation allowance of 20 per cent per annum, the user
cost is still higher under the present system of taxation than under a tonnage tax system.
The results from Section 5.2 showed that although the level of tax payments that many
shipping companies currently pay may not be significantly affected in practice, a tonnage
tax enables the company to have the benefits of certainty, flexibility, clarity and
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competitiveness in a highly cyclical and v<ilatile industry. Also, the tonnage tax removes
the risk of a deferred liability crystallising, and investment can be undertaken on a
commercial basis rather than forming the basis for virtual tax-exemption.
Section 5.3 presented views of shipowners and operators from around the world that have
expressed support for the tonnage tax regime. Section 5.4 set out further important fiscal
benefits of a tonnage tax that include: benefits to profit and loss accounts and balance
sheets because there is no deferred tax liability; certainty and clarity about costs and
liabilities; and depending on its design, facilitating international structures and
arrangements not least by providing a level playing field. This section also stressed the
need for a potent and committed partnership between the Government, business and trade
unions. Section 5.5 identified additional direct and indirect benefits to South Africa, most
notably a strengthening ofthe balance of payments and increased job creation.
Thus the aims of this paper which included alerting the reader to the need for fiscal
reform, and investigating the potential benefits to South Africa and the South African
shipping industry of introducing a tonnage tax have been addressed. The eviJence
suggests that without seriously addressing the South African fiscal shipping environment,
there is little prospect of creating a level playing field which is necessary for South
African shipowners and operators to compete internationally on a more equitable basis. In
order for the fiscal reform to be successfully achieved, a comprehensive package of policy
measures needs to be put in place with the option of a tonnage tax as a key policy. A
tonnage tax can be implemented at minimal cost to the government. With an improved
fiscal environment, a more cohesive set of partnerships between traders, carriers, the
financial sector and the state should result, and these in turn are likely to confer significant
benefits on the wider South African economy.
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6.1 Future Research
This paper has researched many areas pertaining to the effects of corporate taxation on
business investment, the international shipping fiscal environment, and the potential
benefits of a tonnage-based corporate tax system for South Africa and the South Mrican
Shipping industry. In the process of investigating the potential benefits of the tonnage tax,
many questions have been addressed, and in the process new questions and areas for
future research hav.e emerged.
Section 3.1 stated that the corporation tax influences a wide range of corporate decisions
on: (1) the total amount of physical investment to make; (2) the types of physical assets to
purchase; and (3) the way to finance these investments [Lumby, 1994: 13 and Rosen
1995: 438]. This paper has only investigated the corporate tax effect on the total amount
ofphysical investment. Areas 2 and 3 are potential areas for future research. Also, it was
decided that for the purposes of this paper, the neoclassical model of investment would be
used. Future research may be conducted using an alternative theory of investment. As the
characteristics of the shipping industry heighten the importance of cash flow, the author
would suggest, as an important alternative, the use of the cash flow model of investment
for future analysis.
Progress needs to continue to be made in the field of understanding and predicting the
effects of taxation on business investment. Some researchers believe that we may be
asking too much from our data, whose construction deserves considerably more attention,
particularly with respect to timing issues (expenditures versus installation), quality
adjustment, tax impacts (marginal and average, effective and statutory), and the
measurement of other components of the cost of capital. Others are working on the theory
of risk and focusing more attention on the stochastic nature of the investment process.
Still others are investigating aggregation problems over firms, the homogeneity of capital,
the implications of irreversible investments, and the effects of imperfect competition
[Berndt, 1991: 277]. As our understanding of the investment process continues to
improve, so will the quality of research results and hopefully government policy.
99
The paper also noted that one goal of tax policy is the efficient allocation of resources.
From the perspective of real capital, efficiency translates into the familiar "level playing
field" on which different forms of capital investment would compete on equal terms. A
relevant question then is, would the changes in the shipping fiscal environment render the
domestic field between road, rail and sea more level? What would be the direct and
indirect impact of a change to the tonnage tax? Further research will have to be carried
out in this respect in order to establish the impact of a tonnage tax on the share of goods
carries by land or sea.
Section 5.4. 1 stated that one of the fiscal benefits is that a tonnage tax benefits the profit
and loss accounts and balance sheets because there is no deferred tax liability. For public
companies, it would directly increase earnings per share, which is an important yardstick
by which performance is judged, to the extent of what would under the existing regime
had been a provision for deferred tax [Lord Alexander, 1999: pt. 38]. Although it may be
considered early, the author ·has not observe': any increase in P&O share prices to indicate
company benefits of the tonnage tax. Rather, share prices have followed the market trend
in line with other cruise companies [Wavelength, 2000: 2]. Consideration of the effects of
a tonnage tax on company share prices is another area for future research.
Finally, although the tonnage tax should be kept close to its original form in order to
facilitate a more equitable fiscal environment, there is room to fine tune a tonnage tax to
the South Mrican context. Further research needs to be conducted in this regard, and to
determine what the additional policy measures should be in order to implement an optimal
maritime policy package for South Mrica. In particular, the difficult task of how to
fashion a more functional relationship between the trading, shipping, seafaring and
financial communities, must receive attention.
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Appendix B: British Tonnage Tax Calculation
The following extract is taken from the "Draft Clauses / Schedules" in Inland Revenue
[1999].
3 Tonnage tax profits
A3.-(1) A company's tonnage tax profits are calculated by reference to the net tonnage of
the qualifying ships operated by the company.
(2) The tonnage tax profits of a company are brought into charge to corporation tax in
place of the company's relevant shipping profits (see Part F).
(3) A company's tonnage tax activities and relevant shipping profits are ring-fenced for
tax purposes (see-Parts G to J).
(4) Special provisions apply in relation to ships engaged in certain offshore activities (see
Part K).
4 Tonnage tax profits: method ofcalculation
A4.-(1) A company's tonnage tax profits for an accounting period are calculat~d m
accordance with this paragraph.
For the purposes of the calculation the net tonnage of a ship IS rounded down (if
necessary) to the nearest multiple of 100 tons.
(2) The calculation is as follows:
Step One
Determine the notional daily profit for each qualifying ship operated by the company by
reference to the following table and the net tonnage of the ship:
For each 100 tons up to 1,000
tons
For each 100 tons between
1,000 and 10,000 tons
For each 100 tons between
10,000 and 25,000 tons








Work out the ships notional profit for the accounting period by multiplying the notional
daily profit by-
(a) the number of days in the accounting period, or
(b) if the ship was operated by the company as a qualifying ship for only part of
the period, by the number ofdays in that part.
Step Three
Follow steps One and Two for each of the qualifying ships operated by the company in the
accounting period.
Step Four
Add together the resulting amounts and the total is the amount of the company's tonnage
tax profits for that accounting period.
Tonnage tax profits: calculation in case ofjoint operation etc.
A5.-(1) If two or more companies fall to be regarded as operators of a ship by virtue of
sharing the same interest in the ship, the tonnage tax profits of each are calculated as if
each were entitled to a share of the profits proportionate to its share of that interest.
(2) If two or more companies fall to be treated as the operator of a ship otherwise than by
sharing the same interest in the ship, the tonnage tax profits of each are computed as if
each were the only operator.
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Appendix C: Dutch Legislation
Act of21 December 1995. Amendment to the Income Tax Act 1964, the Corporate Tax
Act 1969 and the Tax and National Insurance Credit for Shipping Act 1995 (amendment
to some Tax Acts in the interest of ocean shipping).
To all those whom it may concern:
With regard to Dutch shipping activities, we consider it beneficial to amend the taxation
of profits from shipping and to extend the scope of the "Tax and National insurance
credits for shipping Act";
And so, on the advice of the Council of State, and upon joint consultation with the States
General, we have approved and agreed, as we approve and agree the following:
ARTICLE I
The following amendments have been made to the Income Tax Act 1964.
A. The following shall be inserted after Article 8b:
Article 8c
1. Contrary to the provisions laid down from Articles 7 to 8b inclusive and 9 to 18
inclusive, profits from ocean shipping shall, at the request of the taxpayer, be determined
on the basis of the tonnage of those ships earning the profits. Profits earned during a
calendar year from ocean shipping shall then be assessed per ship on the basis of the
amounts per day shown in the following table.





up to 1000 net-tons
for amounts exceeding this up to 10 000 net tons
for amounts exceeding this up to 25 000 net tons
for amounts exceeding 25 000 net tons
2. For the purposes of this Article profits from ocean shipping shall be taken to be profits
earned, from the exploitation of a ship for the transport of cargo or passengers in
international traffic over sea or for the transport of cargo or passengers over sea on behalf
of exploration or exploitation of natural resources at sea, as well as profits earned from the
use of a ship for towing or the provision of general assistance at sea to ships as mentioned
in Article 1, paragraph 2, Schepenwet. Profits from ocean shipping also include profits
earned from those activities directly related to the use of a ship referred to in the previous
sentence.
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3. For the purposes of this article exploitation of a ship takes place if the taxpayer:
a. has, in the Netherlands substantial control over a ship which he:
1. owns or jointly, owns, except for ships that he has given into bare boat charter, or
2. holds under bare boat charter;
b. has in the Netherlands principal commercial control over a ship on behalf of another
person, provided that the annual total. of the net daily tonnage's is of the ships for which
he performs these activities does not amount to more than three times the annual total of
the net daily tonnage's of the ships that he manages as referred to in part a, whereby the
ships which he jointly owns are only included if the co-ownership amounts to at least 5
percent;
c. holds a ship under a time or voyage charter, provided that the annual total of the net
daily tonnage's of the ships which he holds under time or voyage charter does not amount
to more than three times the annual total of the net daily tonnage's of the ships that he
manages as referred to in part a, whereby the ships which he jointly owns are only
included if the co-ownership amounts to at least 5 percent.
4. In the event that a company is run on behalf of more than one person, paragraph three
applies with respect to that company; if, where there is a company of this kind, the actual
control of a ship is carried out by one or more of the persons on whose aCCOlf.1t the
company is run, this counts as control by the company. If, ina company which is run on
behalf of more than one person, exploitation of a ship takes place, this also applies for the
persons on whose account the business is run.
5. The request referred to in the first paragraph shall be made for each company in the first
year in which the taxpayer earned profits from ocean shipping from the company in
question or in the tenth year or in a subsequent year which is multiple thereof. The tax
inspector shall respond to the request by a decision which may be appealed. If the request
is granted this applies from the year in which the request was made and until further notice
by the taxpayer where further notice is only possible from the tenth year or from a
subsequent year which, is a multiple thereof after the year in which the profits from ocean
shipping were determined on the basis of tonnage.
6. If the request is granted the profit from the year in which the request is made shall also
include the total amount determined according to the position during the period
immediately preceding that year - of:
a. the company's reserves which are related to ocean shipping activities, build up on the
basis of articles 13 and 14; and
b. a sum amounting to the positive difference between the market values attached to the
assets used by the company to earn profits from ocean shipping and the book value of
these assets at that moment.
7. The total amount referred to in paragraph six - or the sum of the total amounts in the
event that the taxpayer has made an request for more than one company as referred to in
paragraph one - shall not be taken into account insofar as this exceeds the amount for
which the taxpayer at the moment specified at the
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beginning of that paragraph can claim carry forward for losses. The tax inspector shall
determine the amount which is not taken into account by company by a decision which
may be appealed.
8. The amount which is not taken into account on the basis of paragraph seven shall still
be included in the profits if the taxpayer, within ten years after the period from which
profits from ocean shipping were determined on the basis of tonnage, discont.inues
(otherwise than by death) the company through which profits from ocean shipping were
earned in the Netherlands either wholly or in part. In the event of the cessation of part of
the company, the amount referred to in the previous sentence shall only be included in the
profits to the extent that it relates to that part of the company. The amount which is still
included in the profits is held to have been earned at the time ofthe cessation.
9. For the purposes ofparagraph eight, a transfer as described in Article 17 paragraph two
shall not be considered as a cessation. nor shall a sale as referred to in Article 18
paragraph one, provided that this is requested by the taxpayer, and, in the event of a
transfer also by the party to whom the transfer is made. In that case the party to whom the
transfer is made or the company into which the business is converted is for the purposes
of paragraph eight, takes the place of the party which has transferred or sold the business.
10. Assets used to earn profits from ocean shipping shall be recorded at market values
when following notice by the taxpayer, paragraph one no longer applies.
11. For the purposes of this Article further rules may be laid down in ministerial
regulations.
B. Article 14c ceases to be applicable.
C. The following shall be inserted after Article 70a:
Article 70b
1. For the purposes of Article 8c paragtapb five the year 1996 shall with regard to a
business from which the taxpayer earned profits from ocean shipping in 1995, be taken as
the first year in which he earned profits from ocean shipping from that business.
2. At the request of the taxpayer who has a loss arising from a shipping deduction, as
described in Article 11 paragraph five of the Incentives for Shipping Act, which is not
fully covered by income earned before 1 January 1996, the Minister may contrary to
paragraph one under provisions to be-set by him deem a later year than 1996,but not later
than 1998, to be the first year in which the taxpayer earned profits from 6cean shipping
from the business. The request shall be submitt6d during 1996.
Article II
The following amendments have been made to the Corporation Tax Act 1969.
A. In Article 8 paragraph one. "8a, 9 to 14c inclusive, 16 and 44b of the income Tax Act
1964 (Law Gazette 1990 103)" shall be replaced by: 8a, 8c, 9 to 14b inclusive, 16 and
44b of the Income
Tax Act 1964.
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B. Article 31b shall be replaced by:
Article lb Articles 70a and 70b of the Income Tax Act 1964 shall apply correspondingly.
Article III
The provisions which pursuant to Article I, part B and Article II, part A are replaced or
amended, shall continue to apply with respect to the structural statements and adjustment
statements dated post 31 December 1995 referred to in Article 11, paragraph five or
Articles 16, 17, 18 or 20 of the. Incentives for Shipping Act. Those rules specified .n the
previous sentence apply correspondingly in the event that at the date of a structural
statement or an adjustment statement, the profit is determined on the basis of Article 8c
of the Income Tax Act 1964.
Article IV
The following amendments have been made to the Tax and National Insurance Credit for
Shipping Act 1995.
A. In Article 2, paragraph two, part a, the words "19 percent" shall be replaced by: 38
percent.
B. In Article 2, paragraph two, part b, the words "5 percent" shall be replaced by: 10
percent.
Article V
This legislation shall become effective from the date on which the bill, introduced by
Royal Message of, 24 May 1995 to amend the Value Added Tax Act 1968, the Taxation,
of Judicial Transactions Act and various other tax laws relating, to disputed constructions
regarding land and buildings (Parliamentary Documents 11, 1994/95, 2.4 -172, nr.2) is




1: Traffic multiplied by long average hauls equals "real" South African seatrade
[Jones, 1999]
2: Gross registered tonnage (grt): The gross tonnage is calculated from the total
volume of all enclosed spaces, measured in cubic meters, using a standard
formula. The gross registered tonnage is expressed in units of 100 cubic feet.
3: Net registered tonnage (nrt): Under the existing rules, nrt is supposed to represent
the cargo volume capacity of the ship and is obtained by deducting certain non-
revenue-earning spaces from the gross registered tonnage. The net registered
tonnage is expressed in units of 100 cubic feet.
4: Article I of the UNCTAD [1986] convention defines the objective as being to
strengthen the genuine link between a state and ships flying its flag, in order to
give more effective control of the identification and accountability of shipowners
and operators especially in administrative, technical, economic and social matters
[Stopford, 1997: 452].
5: A demise or 'bareboat' charter party arises when the charterer is responsible for
providing the cargo and crew, whilst the shipowner merely provides the vessel. In
consequence, the charterer appoints the crew, thus taking over full responsibility
for for the operation of the vessel, and pays all expenses incurred. A demise
charter party is for a period of time which may vary from a few weeks to several
years [Branch, 1981: 291].
6: The words corporation and company will be used interchangeably, and a
definition of company may be found in Meyerowitz [1997: section 17.8].
7: Of course, the money will be taxed when it is eventually paid out, but in the
meantime, the full RIO.OOO grows at the before-tax rate of interest.
8: The price paid by the consumer generally will not rise by the full amount of the
tax. The assumption made in the text is only for convenience, and is strictly
correct only if supply is perfectly price elastic.
9: General equilibrium theory forms a bridge between macroeconomics and
microeconomics, and uses the tools of microeconomics to analyse the behaviour
of the entire economy. The fundamental questions that general equilibrium theory
attempts to answer are the same as those posed in macroeconomic theory: given
different economic environments, what goods will the economy produce, how
will these be produced, and who will obtain them? [Quirk and Saposnik, 1968: 1].
10: These tax provisions may stimulate an increase in demand for output, and thus
indirectly increase investment demand via the accelerator model.
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11 : i is defined as the opportunity cost of funds to the firm. Hence, in this model, i =
(1-8)ig.
12: This assumes that the basis used to compute depreciation allowances is not
reduced when the firm takes the ITC. If the basis is reduced, then the expression
must be modified.
13: For an in-depth discussion of the results see Berndt, 1991: 270-277.
14: The amount is calculated on the adjustable cost as set out in 24.5 in respect of
ships. Before 1995 the depreciation laws allowed for 40 per cent to be written off




Berndt, E. R. (1991) The Practice ofEconometrics - Classic and Contemporary.
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., United States of America.
Branch, E. A. (1982) Economics ofShipping Practice andManagement. Chapman and
Hall: London.
Branch, E.A. (1981) Elements ofShipping. Fifth Edition. Chapman and Hall: London.
Feldstein, M. (Ed.) (1987) Taxes and Capital Formulation. National Bureau ofEconomic
Research. The University ofChicago Press: Chicago.
Goss, R. O. (1970) Studies in Maritime Economics. Cambridge at the University Press.
Jones, T. (1987) The international shipping-i'ldustry and South Africa's seaborne trade.
Technical Report RTI78. National Institute for Transport and Road Research, CSIR,
Pretoria.
Jones, T. (1997) The Port ofDurban and the Durban Metropolitan Economy. Research
Monograph No. 10 Economics Research Unit University ofNatal, Durban.
Jorgenson, D.W. & Kun-Young Yun (1991) Tax Reform and the Cost ofCapital. The
Lindahl Lectures. Clarendon Press. Oxford.
Koutsoyiannis, A. (1985) Modern Microeconomics. Second Edition. Chapter 15
MacMillan.
110
McConville, 1. (1999) Economics ofMaritime Transport: Theory and Practice. First
Edition. The institute of Chartered Shipbrokers: London.
Meyerowitz, D. (1999) Meyerowitz on Income Tax. The Rustica Press: Ndabeni.
Quirk,1. and Saposnik, R. (1968) Introduction to General Equilibrium Theory and
Welfare Economics. Economic Handbook Series. McGraw-Hill: New York.
Rosen, H S. (1985) Public Finance. Irwin Publications in Economics: Illinois.
Rosen, H. S. (1988) Public Finance. Second Edition. Irwin, Inc.: Chicago.
Rosen, H. S. (1992) Public Finance. Third Edition. Irwin, Inc.: Homewood.
Rosen, HS. (1995) Public Finance. Fourth Edition. International Edition. McGraw-Hill:
New York.
Stokes, P. (1997) Ship Finance: Credit Expansion and the Boom-Bust Cycle. Second
Edition, Business of Shipping Series: London.
Stopford, M. (1997) Maritime Economics. Second Edition. Routledge: London.
Veenstra, A. W. (1999) Quantitative Analysis ofShipping Markets. Thesis Series. Delft
University Press: The Netherlands.
Papers
Floor et al (1993) Report of the Com:nittee ofInquiry into a National Maritime Policy for
the Republic of South Africa "The Floor Report".
111
Hampton, M. (1996) "Shipping cycles revisited". Seatrade Review, January.
Inland Revenue (1999) "Tonnage Tax. A New Regime for UK Shipping." Consultation
Pack, December.
Jones, T. and Kennedy, T. (1991) "The Terms of Shipment of South African Seaborne
Trade." The Division ofRoads and Transport Technology, CSIR, Pretoria.
Jones, T. (1991) "The Shipping Industry and the South African Balance ofPayments."
Annual Maritime Conference, Cape Town, April.
Jones, T. (1992) "The South African Shipping Industry: Principal Industry Concerns."
Unpublished report commissioned by South African Shipowners Association.
Jones, T. (1999) Economic ofPorts and Harbours: Notes, mimeD University ofNatal
Durban.
Lord Alexander (1999) "Independent Enquiry Into A Tonnage Tax." July, 1999. A
Report by The Lord Alexander of Weedon QC. Internet.
Mitchell, K., and Mitchell, L., (1999) "Tax Update." The South African Institute of
Chartered Accountants. July and August.
Peters, 1. H. (1993) "The Maritime Transport Crisis." World Bank Discussion Papers No.
220, The World Bank: Washington, D. C.
Portnet (1999a) The Port of Durban Handbook and Directory. Portnet: Johannesburg.
Portnet (1999b) Port ofDurban Statistics. Portnet: Johannesburg.
112
President Mbeki, T. (2000) "State of the Nation Address." National Assembly, Cape
Town, 4 February 2000. Government Communication & Information System: Pretoria.
Staniland, H. (2000) "The Current and Future Legislative and Regulatory Maritime
Framework in South Africa." Presented at the Maritime Africa Conferences (2000) April,
Durban Exhibition Centre, Butterworths.
Statistics South Africa (2000) "October household survey 1998", Narrative Summary.
Statistical Release P0317. 18, May.
Van Niekerk, H.C. (1997) "Proposed New Tax Regime for the SA Shipping Industry."
Research report commissioned by the Department of Transport, Pretoria.
Working Group (1995) Maritime Transport Policy Working Group. Report to Plenary
#1, July.
Articles:
Business Day (2000) July, 4 Business Day with the Financial Times World Wide.
International Section Page 6.
Chartered Institute of Taxation (2000) February 25, at
http://www2.tax.org.uk/newciot/content/Submissions/tonnage%20tax.htm
"TONNAGE TAX: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT LEGISLATION"
Fairplay, (1997) July, 18th "Germany announces new shipping policy."
Fairplay, (1998a) February, 19th "Bonn criticised for tax delay." Pg. 9.
Fairplay, (1998b) February, 26th "Hong Kong owners win tax breaks." Pg. 17.
113
Fairplay, (1998c) March, 19th "China admits crisis." Pg. 14.
Fairplay, (1998d) April, 2nd "Bonn approves tax package." Pg. 9.
Fairplay, (1998e) June, 4th "Finns under pr~essure on tax." Pg. 9.
Fairplay, (1998f) August, 20th "Finland dashes tax hopes." Pg. 15.
Fairplay, (1998g) December, 24/31 "UK unveils tonnage tax plan." Pg. 15.
Fairplay, (1999a) July, 1st "Denmark to study tax options." Pg. 7.
Fairplay, (1999b) September, 2nd "Asset play legitimised. What the new UK rules really
mean." Pg. 22-24.
Fairplay, (1999c) September, 2nd "Mixed results in Europe." Pg. 24.
Fairplay, (1999d) September, 23 rd "Fisher welcomes tonnage tax." Pg. 17.
Fairplay, (199ge) September, 30th "Ireland looks at tonnage tax." Pg. 17.
Fairplay, (1999f) September, 30th "Tax draft faces frosty reception." Pg. 19.
Fairplay, (2000a) March 1st "Indian owners win tax exemption." E-mail.
Fairplay, (2000b) March 1st "New package for Germany's shipping industry." E-mail.
Fairplay, (2000c) June 26th "Indian tonnage tax goes to cabinet." E-mail.
Fairplay, (2000d) June 22nd "Finnish V-turn on tonnage tax." E-mail.
114
First National Bank (2000) Mortgage Loans: Home Loan Base Rate 10/12/86-
01102/2000, mimeo.
Informare, (2000a) April 14, at http://www.informare.it/news/review/1998/joc0406.
"Germany Announces New Shipping Policy." July 18, 1997.
Informare, (2000b) April 14, at http://www.j.nformare.it/news/review/1998/joc0406.
December 17,1998.
Informare, (2000c) April 14, at http://www.informare.it/news/review/1998/joc0406.
"British shipowners welcome proposal on tonnage tax." December 19, 1998.
Informare, (2000d) April 14, at http://www.informare.it/news/review/1998/joc0406.
"More Shipowners Pay No Corporate Tax." April 7, 1999.
Lloyd's Daily Shipping Report, (2000) April 5, "World shipping fleet 16,000 officers
short."
Lloyd's List Mrica Weekly, (1998) November 6 No. 178, "South African ship
registration casts off its historic shackles." Pg 4.
Lloyd's Shipping Index, (2000). The quickest way to find out about the world fleet.
February 28.
Lloyd's Ship Manager, (1999) May, "UK tonnage tax awaits verdict from government-
appointed review."
SA Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review, (2000) Jan/Feb. "Fleet expansion for
SA marine Corporation." Pg. 4.
115
SA Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review, (2000) May/June. "Grindcor optimistic
despite R66 million loss." Pg. 6.
The Baltic, (1999) November, "High hopes for tonnage tax." Pg. 45.
Wavelength, (2000) The P&O Newspaper No. 311. April, "Shares follow market trend."
Pg.2.
116
